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ABSTRACT 
 
This work considers the legal impediments to farming in an urban environment with a 
particular focus on the municipal bylaws that prohibit the keeping of hens in Saskatoon. The 
jurisdictional competency of Saskatoon to prohibit the keeping of urban hens is challenged under 
both municipal law and constitutional law, and more broadly, under the general premise that 
liberty interests should often prevail where a bylaw is arbitrary, misinformed, and restricts the 
pursuit of truth and human flourishing. Saskatoon’s urban hen prohibition is argued to be 
premised more on a form of moral reasoning that unnecessarily distinguishes between rural and 
urban environments, and less, if at all, on empirical evidence.  
Urban agriculture is often undertaken to address the environmental and social shortfalls of 
the global food system, such as the system’s connection with climate change, animal welfare 
issues, and challenges associated with the distribution of food. Moreover, urban agriculture is a 
means of protecting the rights of producers and consumers, as articulated by the food sovereignty 
movement.  In this work, a claimant’s desire to advance food rights (including food sovereignty) 
through the keeping of urban hens is argued to engage the guarantee to freedom of expression 
and freedom of conscience under Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms.1  
This work explores the possibility of protecting the manifestation of social and 
environmental action through the guarantee to freedom of conscience. This work develops a 
cursory test for determining where a claimant’s guarantee to freedom of conscience is violated, 
drawing on the well established protection of freedom of expression and freedom of religion.   
                                                 
1
 The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to The Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, Part I. 
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CHAPTER 1 -  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Crime Scene 
One sweltering hot afternoon in June of 2009, I was tending to my month-old hens while 
chatting with reporter Charles Hamilton in my backyard in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan.
2
 My hens, 
innocently roaming about and pecking at the grass, were illegal hens
3
 being kept contrary to 
Saskatoon’s zoning and animal control bylaws.4 I raised the hens from chicks as an experiment 
in becoming more food self-sufficient and eating from more local sources. My community of 
friends, neighbours, and relatives were curious and supportive of my endeavors.  
I was never fined for keeping the hens, and as far as I know, my hen keeping was never 
reported. To my surprise, the hens did not even excite the one hundred plus pound hounds living 
next door.  While my hens appeared to be welcomed by all in the neighbourhood, others have not 
been so lucky. For example, Ms. Massier of Regina, mother of two, was recently fined for 
keeping four hens in her backyard. Ms. Massier had kept the hens for nearly three years. One of 
her supportive neighbours told reporters that the hens taught Ms. Massier’s and others’ kids a lot 
about animals, and further, that the hens were  “[n]ever loud, never dirty”, but rather, they were 
“perfect neighbour chickens.”5 There was no suggestion in the complaint against Ms. Massier’s 
leading to the apprehension of the hens that the hens had ever caused a nuisance.
6
  
                                                 
2
 Charles Hamilton, “Pro-Poultry Protesters Raising Chickens Despite Council’s Condescending 
Clucks”, Planet S: Saskatoon’s City Magazine, Vol 12 Iss 9, 2009. Online: Planet S 
<www.planetsmag.com/story.php?id=51>. [Hamilton] 
3
 Sarah B. Schindler, “Of Backyard Chickens and Front Yard Gardens: The Conflict Between 
Local Governments and Locavores”, 87 Tul L Rev 231 2012-2013 at 233 [Schindler] 
4
 Hamilton, supra note 2.  
5
 Steve Silva, “City forces woman to get rid of backyard chickens”, Global News (Regina), 
online: globalnews.ca/news/1591437/city-forces-woman-to-get-rid-of-backyard-chickens/.  
6
 Ibid.  
 2 
Debbie Johnson, a retired librarian of Saskatoon, was also fined for keeping hens. She kept  
her hens as pets – pets that created nutritious eggs.7 She encouraged city council to change its 
bylaws that prohibit hens, twice.
8
 On both occasions, the city did not give thorough reasons as to 
why her motion to amend the urban hen prohibition should not be granted.
9
  
This work aims to provide a legal opportunity for those willing to brave the judicial route 
for change in the face of councils unwilling to change their urban micro-livestocking 
prohibitions. 
1.2 Bringing Hen Prohibitions to Court 
When the hearts and minds of municipal legislators are closed to urban hen reform, some 
people challenge hen-keeping prohibitions bylaws in court.
10
 In R. v Smedley,
11
 Mr. Smedley of 
Halifax, Nova Scotia was unluckily charged for keeping 13 chickens in his backyard. Mr. 
Smedley, his wife, and his children, kept the chickens as pets – pets that produced eggs as a 
“happy coincidence”.12 The Court ultimately convicted Mr. Smedley on the basis that chickens 
were covered under the definition of “fowl” in the local land-use bylaw, which prohibits the 
keeping of fowl. Mr. Smedley did not raise any jurisdictional or Charter defences. 
Notwithstanding the conviction, the Honourable Judge Jamie Campell made several noteworthy 
findings of fact: 
                                                 
7
 Hamilton, supra note 2.  
8
 Hamilton, supra note 2; David Hutton, “Council balks at backyard chickens – again”, 14 
September 2010, online: < blogs.thestarphoenix.com/2010/09/14/council-balks-at-backyard-
chickens-again/>. 
9
 Ibid.  
10
 See e.g. R v Smedley, 2008 NSPC 9; 262 NSR (2d) 375 [Smedley], where the defendants were 
unsuccessful at classifying their chickens as pets as opposed to fowl; Kamloops (City) v Plante, 
2008 BCSC 32.  
11
 Ibid (Smedley). 
12
 Ibid at 1-5. 
 3 
In summary, the chickens kept by this family are pets. They are in virtually every way 
inoffensive. There is no evidence that they are now creating excessive or even noticeable 
noise. There is no offensive odour. The way in which they are kept is not unsightly. The 
chickens remain on their own property seemingly doing no harm to either the aesthetic 
qualities of the neighbourhood nor to the quiet enjoyment of the property of the 
immediate neighbours. As compared to some other activities that might be legally 
undertaken on a residential property, the keeping of these pet chickens seems relatively 
benign. No allegation has been made and no evidence has been adduced to suggest that 
these chickens attract vermin.
13
 
While there would be no strong issue to be taken with the determination in Smedley that 
chickens might reasonably be construed as “fowl”, the comments by Campell J. provides some 
insight into why many want to change urban hen prohibitions; if keeping urban hens can be “in 
virtually every way inoffensive”, then on what basis, other than an assumed power to do so by 
municipal decision-makers, can keeping hens be maintained as a regulatory offence? 
R v Hughes,
14
 a case of the Alberta Provincial Court in 2012 is closely considered 
throughout this work. Mr. Hughes self-reported his chicken keeping to the city and was 
subsequently charged with keeping livestock (to wit, six chickens) contrary to Calgary’s zoning 
and pet bylaws.
15
 There was no evidence led by the city that anyone had ever complained of Mr. 
Hughes’ challenged activity, or, as with the cases of Ms. Messier, Ms. Johnson, and the 
Smedleys, above, that his violation had caused a nuisance.
16
 Nonetheless, Mr. Hughes was fined 
and the chickens apprehended and subsequently relocated.   
                                                 
13
 Ibid at 15.  
14
 R v Hughes, 2009 ABCA 11, 446 AR 351.  
15
 Ibid at para 5. See also ss 27 and 2(1)(n)(v) of the City of Calgary’s Responsible Pet 
Ownership Bylaw 23M2006 [“RPO Bylaw”] 
16
 Ibid at para 70.  
 4 
Mr. Hughes was characterized by the presiding trial judge, the Honourable Madam Judge 
Catherine M. Skene.
17
, as a responsible urban hen owner.
18
 Skene J. observed that Mr. Hughes is 
a veteran from the Canadian infantry and receives social assistance payments.
19
 The hens’ eggs 
were consumed within Mr. Hughes’ household and never sold for financial gain.20  
Mr. Hughes is a vocal advocate for many causes, one of them being local food production. 
He is the founder of the advocacy group CLUCK (Canadian Liberated Urban Chicken Klub).
21
 
He tries to live as sustainably as possible, producing as much food as he could on his residential 
lot.
22
 His efforts to live sustainably are also observed in his effort to change local bylaws.  
Following Mr. Hughes unsuccessful attempt at judicial intervention, this work considers 
the legal recourse that people like Mr. Hughes or Debora Johnson should have with the courts 
when city councils deny the implementation of pilot projects and maintain the prohibition of 
urban hens based on thin or speculative empirical evidence.  Specifically, this work considers the 
scope of municipal jurisdiction to prohibit urban hens with a focus on municipal law, freedom of 
expression, and freedom of conscience.   
1.3 General Premises 
This work argues that it is outside the scope of municipal authority to prohibit the keeping 
of urban chickens unless such measures are undertaken or justified pursuant to their provincially 
delegated powers and the powers incidental thereto. The argument that chickens belong in rural 
                                                 
17
 While this work takes many issues with Skene J.’s judgement, such departures were only made 
possible because of Skene J.’s thorough attention and recital of the facts of Mr. Hughes case, 
and accordingly, Skene J.’s work is deserving of a considerable amount of respect.  
18
 Ibid at para 81.  
19
 Ibid at paras 15, 19.  
20
 Ibid at para 14.  
21
 Ibid at para 15.  
22
 Ibid at para 18.  
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areas, on its own, is suggested to be a form of moral reasoning that is outside municipal 
jurisdiction and therefore insufficient to justify the prohibition of keeping small livestock. As 
such, this work advocates for a restriction on moral reasoning by municipal decision makers in 
relation to urban food production.  
This work proposes that the judiciary may be required, from time to time, to strike down 
otherwise valid municipal bylaws on the basis of a claimant’s moral reasoning in relation to a 
restrictive municipal bylaw. The protection of fundamental freedoms under the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms,
23
 such as freedom of conscience and freedom of expression, can require the court 
to consider whether the claimant is engaged in activity premised on a subjectively held 
conscientious or moral position. Accordingly, urban farming, if undertaken in connection with a 
subjectively held moral position, may attract Charter protection.  
This work provides examples of opportunities presented by various legal tests to implore 
the liberty of peoples to manifest their social and environmental beliefs.  Specifically, this work 
uses the paradigm of food sovereignty, and the associated considerations of global climate 
change and distributive challenges within the global industrial food system, to justify the keeping 
of chickens in urban environments. What is generally assumed throughout this work is that 
agriculture is required for survival. At the same time, those support systems that allow for 
agriculture, like an appropriate climate, are at risk.  
While this work is focused primarily on the keeping of urban hens, as was at issue in 
Hughes, the general principles and themes explored throughout this work are equally applicable 
to the keeping of other micro-livestock, such as goats, sheep, pigs, rabbits, or other small 
                                                 
23
 The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, Part I 
[Charter of Rights and Freedoms].  
 6 
animals. Hughes is used as a contextual aid for discussing Saskatoon’s urban livestock 
prohibition. The similarities between Saskatchewan and Alberta’s municipal legal frameworks 
assist in drawing similarities between Saskatoon’s bylaws and those considered in Hughes.  
This project relies considerably on the observations of municipal land-use made by 
Mariana Valverde, Director of Criminology at the University of Toronto. Valverde’s works 
suggest that municipal governance is premised on physical unity and conformity as a desirable 
feature of urban spaces.
24
 Accordingly, municipal support for diversity, liberty and nature is 
habitually compromised by preferences for uniformity.
25
  
A very important topic not directly considered in this work is the animal-human nexus or 
other issues concerning animal rights, which should be considered when regulating animals. This 
work largely assumes the possibility of raising, nurturing, harvesting from and slaughtering 
animals as part of a sustainable human-ecological food system. It is also assumed throughout this 
work that it is generally more socially and environmentally friendly to raise animals in one’s 
backyard when using simplistic modes of production than it is to raise animals in conditions 
common to intensive livestock operations.   
This work criticizes the lack of consideration of empirical evidence relating to the safety of 
keeping a nominal number of chickens in urban environments. Somewhat hypocritically, the 
consideration of empirical evidence on the safety of keeping urban chickens is limited in this 
work. That being said, this work does seek to challenge some of the popular arguments against 
keeping chickens in urban spaces. Constraints on space and time make it impractical to consider 
all scientific authorities on the safety of keeping chickens, and other empirical issues raised in 
                                                 
24
 Mariana Valverde, Everyday law on the street: city governance in an age of diversity, 
(Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, 2012), [Valverde, Everyday law on the street].  
25
 Ibid.  
 7 
this work. However, this work does claim that most of the issues addressed in this work are not 
significantly contentious from an empirical vantage, and therefore, the cursory overview of the 
empirical issues considered in this work may very well lead the reader to confidently form an 
opinion.  
1.4 Overview 
Following this section, Chapter 2, “Background on Bylaws, Agriculture, and the 
Environment”, provides an overview of the history of some of Saskatoon’s bylaws that relate to 
the keeping and management of animals in the city. Chapter 2 concludes with an overview of 
Saskatoon’s urban agriculture scene, the modern food system, and climate change. Overall, this 
Chapter identifies some of the historical and modern trends that are used to contextualize food 
rights movements.  
Chapter 3, “The Theory of Food Rights in Canada”, provides a cursory social and 
environmental theoretical framework for advancing food rights claims. This section draws on a 
variety of sources, such as international human rights treaties, as well as grass roots movements, 
such as food sovereignty, which is a constitutionally entrenched principal in some countries. 
These theories and principals provide language and moral associations that could assist a 
claimant in establishing a valid, subjective opposition to laws that restrict food production.  
Chapters 4 and 5 analyze Saskatoon’s prohibitive bylaws and their validity pursuant to 
constitutional principles of municipal jurisdiction and the Charter. As required by these analyses, 
Chapter 4, “Municipal Authority and Urban Chickens” undertakes a cursory review of some of 
the most common nuisance-based arguments that are used to support prohibitive bylaws. The 
urban livestock prohibitions are often defended in relation to concerns of noise, smell, rodents, 
and disease. However, a review of the empirical evidence suggests that there is no connection 
 8 
between these concerns and keeping a few small animals on an urban residential plot. It is 
observed that the reason for prohibiting urban micro-livestocking is based on the social 
conscription that keeping food in urban settings is immoral. It is argued that this type of 
reasoning is beyond the jurisdiction of municipalities. This argument is buttressed by Valverde’s 
observations on the hierarchal nature of urban zoning, which is also explored in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5, “The Charter’s Protection of Urban Micro-livstocking” focuses primarily on 
Hughes and Mr. Hughes’ arguments that freedom of conscience and expression allows him to 
keep urban hens in prescribed conditions. The rare but emerging idea of freedom of conscience is 
reviewed in conjunction with its counterpart, freedom of religion, in an attempt to delineate the 
potential scope of freedom of conscience in relation to the claims made by Mr. Hughes. It is 
suggested that the scope of freedom of conscience likely overlaps significantly with freedom of 
expression. In the case of Hughes, and most potential litigants, it would be unlikely that his 
keeping of urban hens is not expressive, given that it served as a demonstration site and model to 
others wishing to live more sustainably.  
  
 9 
CHAPTER 2 -  BACKGROUND ON BYLAWS, AGRICULTURE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 
2.1 Saskatoon’s Bylaws 
Saskatoon’s Animal Control Bylaw, 1999 
Chickens are prohibited pursuant to Section 22(1) of Saskatoon’s The Animal Control 
Bylaw, 1999
26
 (“Animal Control Bylaw”). Section 22(1) is titled “Owning and Harbouring Exotic 
and Wild Animals” and makes it an offence to own or harbour the animals listed in Schedule No. 
5. That schedule includes many animals that are known to cause nuisances or are potentially 
dangerous to humans, such as skunks, scorpions, crocodilians, gorillas, venomous reptiles and 
amphibians, pythons, boa constrictors, bears, and hyenas.
27
 The list also includes animals that are 
not as readily associated with danger and nuisance, such as:  
(b) all Artiodactylus Ungulates (such as goats, sheep, cattle, pigs and llamas); 
… 
(r) all Galliformes (such as chickens, turkeys, grouse, quails and pheasants); 
… 
(s) all Anseriformes (such as ducks and geese);
28
 
The animals that are expressly not prohibited in Schedule No. 5 include: domestic dogs and 
cats, domestic ferrets, some types of tarantulas.
29
 The Animal Control Bylaw also permits the 
keeping of pigeons and bees
30
 and appears silent with respect to the keeping of sea creatures and 
rabbits. The purpose of the bylaw is discussed more in section 4.2 below.  
Section 23(1) provides exemptions to owning and harbouring exotic and wild animals for 
listed organizations, such as the Animal Control Agency, the Saskatoon Forestry Farm, the 
                                                 
26
 City of Saskatoon, Animal Control Bylaw, 1999, Bylaw No 7860, Codified to Bylaw No 8990 
(December 19, 2011). [Animal Control Bylaw, 1999] 
27
 Ibid, Schedule No 5.  
28
 Ibid [emphasis added].   
29
 Ibid.  
30
 Ibid, s 19-21.  
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Saskatoon Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and licensed veterinarians. It also 
permits Schedule No. 5 animals to be kept as research subjects at the University of Saskatchewan 
or the Saskatchewan Institute of Applied Science and Technology, or anyone holding a license 
under any statute of the Legislature of Saskatchewan or the Government of Canada.
31
 
Furthermore the 4-H club, petting zoos and other such agencies can keep animals for public 
display provided that the animals are not displayed for more than 72 hours and that a number of 
other strict animal welfare and public health precautions are followed.
32
   
Violators of the Animal Control Bylaw are subject to the general penalty provision of the 
bylaw, which provides that anyone who contravenes the bylaw is liable on summary conviction 
to a fine not less “than the mandatory minimum fine prescribed in Schedule No. 7 and not more 
than $2,000.”33 Interestingly, there is no mandatory minimum in Schedule No. 7 for the offence 
of harbouring an animal listed in Schedule No. 5. The penalty provision of the Bylaw goes on to 
suggest that in default of a fine, that a Court may order “imprisonment of an individual for a term 
not exceeding one year”.34 While a court would not routinely impose a term of imprisonment 
under this bylaw for a first time chicken-keeper in default, the bylaw suggests that such a penalty 
is open to be imposed on the most heinous of serial chicken-keepers.  
                                                 
31
 Ibid, s 23(1)(a) –(f).  
32
 Ibid, s 23.1. 
33
 Ibid s 24(1)(a). 
34
 Ibid, s 24(1).  
 11 
Saskatoon’s Zoning Bylaw 
The keeping of livestock is prohibited in Saskatoon’s residential zones. Section 2 of 
Zoning Bylaw No. 8770 of The City of Saskatoon (Zoning Bylaw)
35
 defines livestock as: cattle, 
sheep, swine, goats, llamas, horses, chickens, turkeys, waterfowl and similar animals.
36
 Section 
5.23 of the Zoning Bylaw prohibits the keeping of livestock in all districts of the city except for 
agricultural and future urban development districts.
37
 Section 5.23 also makes several exceptions 
similar to section 23(1) of the Animal Control Bylaw, such as the keeping of livestock on the 
premise of the SPCA, in a veterinary clinic or hatchery, or by anyone specifically licensed to do 
so under stated conditions.
38
 In contrast to livestock, the keeping of domestic animals is 
permitted in all districts, subject to laws governing noise and public health.
39
  
Other Jurisdictions 
Many Canadians might be surprised to learn that the United States’ most populated cities 
including New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago
40
 all permit keeping urban chickens.
41
 A survey 
                                                 
35
 City of Saskatoon, Zoning Bylaw No 8770, Codified to Bylaw No 9162, January 6, 2014. 
[Zoning Bylaw] 
36
 Ibid s 2.  
37
 Ibid s 5.23(2)(a)-(b).  
38
 Ibid s 5.23 (2)(c)-(g) 
39
 Ibid s 5.23(3).  
40
 See e.g. Municipal Code of Chicago, Chapter 7-12 on Health and Safety, Animal Care and 
Control, Current through Council Journal of September 10, 2014, online: American Legal 
Publishing Corporation 
<amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Illinois/chicago_il/municipalcodeofchicago?f=templates$fn=def
ault.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:chicago_il>. [Municipal Code of Chicago] 
41
 See e.g. Josh Marcellin, “Fight for your right to poultry Dozens of North American cities 
allow backyard chickens, so what the cluck Edmonton?”, 14 January 2014, online: 
vueweekly.com <www.vueweekly.com/fight-for-your-right-to-poultry/>. 
 12 
conducted in 2012 indicates that 84% of America’s largest 100 cities allow chickens in 
residential areas, and only three of America’s 100 largest cities prohibit keeping chickens.42   
In Canada, you can also find cities from coast to coast that permit the keeping of hens in 
urban residential areas.
43
 There are at least 24 Canadian urban municipalities that permit keeping 
urban hens.
44
 However, unlike the U.S., most of Canada’s largest cities prohibit chickens from 
residential areas. Chickens are not permitted in residential areas of Toronto, Montreal, Calgary, 
                                                 
42
 Jaime M. Bouvier, “Illegal Fowl: A Survey of Municipal Laws Relating to Backyard Poultry 
and a Model Ordinance for Regulating City Chickens”, Environmental Law Reporter, Sept, 
2012, Vol.42(9), p.10888-10920 at 10899 [Bouvier].  
43
 See e.g. Kouri Research, “Towards a Food Strategy for Saskatoon: Saskatoon Regional Food 
System Assessment and Action Plan”, CHEP, December 2013, online: <www.chep.org>. 
[Kouri Research] 
44
 Heather Beyko “Fowl Play? A Look into Recent Canadian Reform Efforts for Backyard 
Chicken Legislation”, 19 September 2012, online: ablawg.ca <ablawg.ca/2012/09/19/fowl-
play-a-look-into-recent-canadian-reform-efforts-for-backyard-chicken-legislation>, which lists 
the following bylaws and cities that regulate chickens as opposed to prohibiting them: “District 
of Saanich, BC (s. 38, Animals Bylaw, 2002, No. 8556); District of Oak Bay, BC (ss. 26-28.2, 
Animal Control Bylaw, No. 4013); Township of Esquimalt, BC (Part 6, Animal Bylaw 2002, 
No. 2495); City of Richmond, BC (Part 3, Animal Control Regulation Bylaw, No. 7932); Town 
of Gibsons, BC (not explicitly prohibited in bylaws); City of Surrey, BC (Part 4(B), s. 7, 
Zoning By-law, No. 12000); City of New Westminster, BC (not explicitly prohibited in 
bylaws); City of Rossland, BC (s. 9.1, Animal Control Bylaw, No. 2357); City of Airdre, AB 
(not explicitly prohibited in bylaws); City of Grand Prairie, AB (not explicitly prohibited in 
bylaws); Town of Peace River, AB (Part 1, s.1, Animal Control Bylaw, No. 1832); City of Fort 
Saskatchewan, AB (“chicken” is included in the definition of “domestic animal”, Animal 
Control Bylaw, C1-02); City of Waterloo, ON (s. 8 and Schedule “C”, Animal Control By-law, 
No. 09-047); City of Guelph, ON (s. 1, Exotic and Non-Domestic Animals By-law, No. (1985)-
11952); City of Brampton, ON (s. 11, Animal Control By-law, No. 261-93); City of Niagara 
Falls, ON (Schedule “C”, Animal Control By-law, No. 2002-129); City of Quinte West, ON 
(Backyard Hens Licensing and Control By-law, No. 11-138); City of Gatineau, QB (Chapter 6, 
Animal Control Bylaw, No. 183-2005) (in French only); and City of Whitehorse, YT (s. 49, 
Animal Control Bylaw, No. 2001-01)”; See also Monique Beaudin, “Chickens make their way 
back to Montreal”16 July 2011, online: <montrealgazette.com/news/local-news/chickens-
make-their-way-back-to-montreal>; Red Deer, AB, Bylaw No. 3517/2014 - Being A Bylaw Of 
The City Of Red Deer, In The Province Of Alberta, To Regulate The Keeping Of Chickens In 
Urban Areas; Kingston “City of Kingston Rules and Regulations Pertaining to Backyard 
Hens”, online: City of Kingston 
<https://www.cityofkingston.ca/documents/10180/26367/Backyard%20Hens%20Rules/2dcab1
c0-d76f-4187-a15b-fa49bcd878b2>. 
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Ottawa, Quebec, Winnipeg, Hamilton, Halifax, Oshawa, Saskatoon, and Regina. Vancouver, 
London, Waterloo and Victoria are the largest centers that permit keeping chickens. Some cities 
are in transition, such as Edmonton, where a pilot project has been implemented to gather more 
information needed to decide if they will amend their prohibitive bylaws.
45
 Certainly, the trend in 
Canada is towards allowing chickens back into the city. For example, Red Deer (AB),
46
 St. John 
(NB)
47
 and Fredericton (PEI),
48
 have amended their bylaws since 2012 to permit keeping urban 
hens in residential areas.  
Chickens are usually allowed in urban areas either by way of detailed guidelines and 
regulations, or by simply not prohibiting or regulating them (i.e. deregulation). Vancouver is one 
example of where the keeping of hens is significantly regulated. Vancouver’s Animal control 
Bylaw 9150
49
 prohibits keeping chickens subject to permitted conditions as set out by the bylaw. 
A maximum of four (4) hens can be kept
50
 provided that they are registered (online or in 
person),
51
 and that the hens are kept in detailed conditions. At section 7.16, these conditions 
control important aspects of a hen’s life, including the minimal permissible coop size; perch 
dimensions; required access to earth or vegetated floors; provisions for food, water, shelter, light, 
ventilation and “opportunities for essential behaviours such as scratching, dust bathing and 
                                                 
45
 See e.g. Elise Stotle, “City hall approves chicken pilot project”, Edmonton Journal, 19 August 
2014, online: <www.edmontonjournal.com>. 
46
 See e.g. CBC News, “Should Edmonton Allow Chickens?”, CBC, Jul 02, 2014, online: 
www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/should-edmonton-allow-backyard-chickens-1.2694029 
47
  City of Saint John, Zoning Bylaw, December 2014, s 9.10 titled “General provisions, Uses 
permitted in multiple Zones”. 
48
 City of Fredericton, By-Law No. Z-5, A Zoning By-Law For The City Of Fredericton , 24 June 
2013, s 7.3(9).  
49
 City of Vancouver, British Columbia, Bylaw 9150, consolidated to January 31, 2013.  
50
 Ibid at s 7.5(c) 
51
 Ibid at s 7.15.  
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roosting”; the removal or composting of manure; and that residents may keep “hens for personal 
use only, and may not sell eggs, manure, meat, or other products derived from hens.”52    
In Victoria, there is no limit on the number of hens that can be kept,
53
 so long as the 
number is consistent with household egg consumption.
54
 As in Vancouver, roosters are 
prohibited in Victoria.
55
 Victoria’s bylaws are notably less involved than those of Vancouver. 
Animal welfare and nuisance interests are presumably protected by other bylaws. Many cities in 
the United States, such as Chicago, share similar means of permitting urban poultry as Victoria 
does.
56
 Saint John, New Brunswick, provides an example of a regulatory context that is in 
between Vancouver and Victoria. In Saint John, some of the main regulations include: a 
limitation of six (6) hens (i.e. no roosters), coops must be three (3) meters from rear lots or 
neighbour’s property lines, manure stored on site must be sealed, and dead chickens are to be 
disposed of with abattoirs or veterinarians.
57
  
2.2 History of Saskatoon’s Animal bylaws 
Over the past century, most North American cities have flip-flopped between allowing 
urban chickens and prohibiting them. Many cities, including Saskatoon, were encouraged in 
patriotic language to increase local food production as a response to food shortages during World 
                                                 
52
 Ibid at s 7.16. 
53
 City of Victoria, Bylaw NO. 11-044, Animal Control Bylaw  
54
 see City of Victoria, “Backyard Chickens”, Victoria Animal Control Services Ltd., online: 
<www.vacs.ca/bylaw-regulations/backyard-chickens/register-your-chickens>. 
55
 Ibid, 27(1)(b).  
56
 See e.g. Municipal Code of Chicago, supra note 40. 
57
 Saint John Zoning Bylaw, supra note 47. 
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War I and II, and during the great depression.
58
 Following WWII, chickens were pushed out of 
cities in concert with the building of supermarkets and the industrialization of food and 
agriculture. As such, the historical account of the chicken leaving the city appears to correlate 
strongly with changes in the food system. None of the materials reviewed suggested that 
nuisance concerns or changes in understanding of health risks drove the decisions to prohibit 
chickens in the city.  
The keeping of chickens, or even gardening for that matter, is not frequently referenced in 
Saskatoon’s historical records,59 and accordingly, this section tries to glean from the bylaws what 
was happening in the city with regard to animals. The prevalence of livestock and urban 
gardening during the early years may have simply been too commonplace to make special note 
of in historical literature.
60
 Geographers Jennifer Blech and Helga Letiner suggest that “less is 
known about the shifting presence of smaller animals—honeybees, rabbits, and poultry—but it 
can be presumed that these also were present in considerable number, replaced as food became 
easier to purchase than produce.”61 The prevalence of keeping small animals in Saskatoon may 
have been less than in other cities at the turn of the 20
th
 century, given that many of the early 
                                                 
58
 Carol Martin, A History of Canadian Gardening (Toronto: McArthur and Company, 2000) at 129; 
William W Thomson, “Gardening in Saskatchewan” Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture, Bulletin 
No 55, Regina, 1917. Retrieved on microfilm, online: <archive.org/details/cihm_84714>.  
59
 There may be several factors contributing to the lack of historical record. First, tending to 
small animals and vegetable plots was traditionally a role undertaken by women and children; 
see eg. Carol Martin, A History of Canadian Gardening (Toronto, ON: McArthur and 
Company, 2000) at page 51-53. Don Kerr, an influential historian on Saskatoon, writes in Don 
Kerr & Stan Hanson, Saskatoon: The First Half-Century, (Edmonton: Newest Press, 1982) at 
page 65 [Kerr & Hanson] that the recorded history of Saskatoon is focused on men. 
60
 Jennifer Blech and Helga Leitner, “Reimagining the food system, the economy, and urban life: 
new urban chicken-keepers in US cities”, Urban Geography, 2014, 35:1, 86-108.  
61
 Ibid at page 87.  
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British-colonial settlers of Saskatoon had “laughable” skills in farming,62 and purchased 
gardening produce from local Sioux who were confined to what is now Whitecap Dakota First 
Nation.
63
 
Early Bylaws 
In 1906, the City of Saskatoon enacted its first Public Health Regulations
64
 concerned with 
a wide range of public health and nuisance related issues, including inter alia: contagious 
diseases (e.g. small pox and typhoid fever),
65
 slaughter houses,
66
 and nuisances arising from 
butchers, dead animals and animal waste,
67
 animal stables,
68
 and privies (outhouses)
69
. The 
bylaw regulated the frequency that stables needed to be cleaned, the handling of dead animals,
 70
 
and the maximum proximity of wells from slaughterhouses, privies and stables.
71
 Under these 
regulations, stables housing one cow for more than two hours were required to be located at least 
100 feet from any dwelling (for more than six cows, the distance increased to 300 feet).
72
 The 
bylaw is notably focused on ways of minimize the risk of water contamination and human 
exposure to hazardous concentrations of animal and human waste.  
                                                 
62
 Kerr & Hanson, supra note 59 at page 49.  
63
 Ibid, page 33.    
64
 City of Saskatoon, Bylaw 80, A Bylaw relating to Public Health, 12 September, 1906. 
[Saskatoon – Public Health]; Saskatoon implemented regulations dealing with the control of 
animals even before it became a city. See Town of Saskatoon, Bylaw #15, December, 1903 
required the owners of “herds of horses” and “droves of cattle” to have full control over them if 
moving them through the streets; Similarly, Town of Saskatoon Bylaw 27,9 June 1904 
prohibited animals from running at large within the city limits. 
65
 Ibid at s 5-24.  
66
 Ibid at s 25-30. 
67
 Ibid at s 34-45.  
68
 Ibid at s 49-52.  
69
 Ibid at s 69.  
70
 Ibid at s 34.  
71
 Ibid at s 58(b).  
72
 Ibid at s 50-52.  
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The Advent of Zoning 
The Saskatoon planning board established its first comprehensive zoning bylaws in 1930.
73
 
The 1930 Zoning Bylaw contained many of the same provisions that are found in today’s zoning 
bylaw. The bylaw regulated land use within the city and also incorporated many of the pre-
existing public health regulations. For example, the bylaw defined private stables as stables:  
with capacity for not more than two (2) horses, one (1) cow, two (2) goats, or poultry for 
private use. However, on sites having an area of more than five thousand (5000) square 
feet, the capacity of a stable may be increased by one horse, or one cow for every twenty-
five hundred square feet of site area
74
 
“Stables” were permitted in residential neighborhoods provided they could be set back 
from the house by fifty feet and the rear lane by four feet.
75
 Private stables, which specified a 
permissible number of horses, cows, goats and poultry that could be kept on city lots, became 
prohibited following a series of amendments to Saskatoon’s zoning bylaws in the 1960s.76 
Interestingly, the 1930 Zoning Bylaw was more welcoming to cows than was Saskatoon’s 1906 
Public Health Regulations. The relaxation of the 1930s bylaw from early bylaws coincided with 
the great depression and demonstrates that eventual removal of livestock from the city was not 
linear. 
During WWI, the Great Depression and WWII, urban agriculture occurred on grand scales 
as resilience to “extreme shock to urban food and energy supplies”.77 For example, nearly 1,000 
                                                 
73
 City of Saskatoon, Bylaw # 2051, Zoning Bylaw, 19 May 1930 [Saskatoon – Zoning 1930].  
74
 Ibid, s 2(30).  
75
 Ibid, s 7.  
76
 See Zoning Bylaw, supra note 35 s.5.23(4) requires that kennel enclosures be set back 1 metre  
77
 Kyle Clark and Kimberly A. Nicholas, “Introducing urban food forestry: a multifunctional 
approach to increase food security and provide ecosystem services” Landscape Ecol (2013) 
28:1649–1669 at page1651. See also MacRae Rod et al.“Could Toronto provide 10% of its 
fresh vegetable requirements from within its own boundaries? Matching consumption 
requirements with growing spaces”. Journal of Agriculture, Food Systems, and Community 
Development, 2010 1(2): 105–127 at page 108 where MacRae noted that in 1944, victory 
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of Saskatoon’s empty lots were under cultivation during WWI.78 Generally, livestock were 
invited back into cities throughout North America where they had previously been pushed out 
during this era.
79
 Chickens were primarily farmed for their eggs; meat was a byproduct.
80
  It was 
common in North America during this period to have a few chickens in the backyard to 
supplement local consumption during this period. Simultaneously, there was a growing tendency 
of establishing larger-scale poultry facilities to feed soldiers overseas.
81
 
1950s – 1980s 
A major period in agricultural policy changes followed WWII and continued through the 
70s.
82
 The 1960s brought an increase in urbanization and mass-produced foods resulting in the 
pervasion of supermarkets.
83
 On the global scene, US food aid was used to encourage 
industrialization and market liberalization in select developing countries. In Asia, the Green 
Revolution extended market relations into the countryside.
84
  
                                                                                                                                                             
gardens produced 46% of the fresh vegetable supply in the U.S.  In Canada, there was a total of 
200,000 WWII wartime and Victory Gardens that produced 52 million kg of vegetables.  
78
 Kerr & Hanson, supra note 59 at page 254. 
79
 Jennifer Blecha, Urban life with livestock: Performing alternative imaginaries through small-
scale urban livestock agriculture in the United States, Doctoral dissertation, University of 
Minnesota, July 2007 at 14; William Butler, “Welcoming animals back to the city: Navigating 
the tensions of urban livestock through municipal ordinances.” Journal of Agriculture, Food 
Systems, and Community Development, 2012 2(2), 193–215 at 196. 
80
 Pew Environmental Group. “Big Chicken: Poultry and Industrial Poultry Production in 
America”, 2011, Washington, DC: The Pew Environmental Group. [Pew Environmental] 
81
 Pat McNight, “Urban-chicken History”. Urban Farm Online, 7 March 2014, online: 
<www.urbanfarmonline.com/urban-livestock/chickens/chicken-history.aspx> 
82
 Philip McMichael, “A food regime genealogy”, The Journal of Peasant Studies, 36:1, 139-169 
(2009) at 141 [McMichael].  
83
 See e.g. Tony Weis, The Global Food Economy: The Battle for the Future of Farming, 
(London: Fernwood Publishing, 2007) at 89-127.  
84
 McMichael, supra note 82 at 141.  
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This period was marked by increasing capitalization of the food chain and also brought 
changes at the municipal level. History Professor Andrea Gaynor in her book Harvest the 
Suburbs
85
 explains the prevalence of prohibitive zoning bylaws implemented during the 1960’s: 
[T]he increasing restriction on the keeping of productive animals was based as much on 
the abandonment of a perceived out dated rural era in favor of a progressive urban 
ideology’ as it was on concerns for health or the obviation of nuisances. This ‘urban 
ideology’ – part of the ‘modern outlook’ – included an element which lauded 
consumption and disparaged at least some types of production. Margo Huxley has 
proposed that such ‘by‐laws’ can be seen to support consumerist trends in domestic life 
by regulating the amount of (non‐horticultural) food production which can be undertaken 
on suburban blocks.
86
 
The allowance of stables on urban lots, as provided for in the original 1930 Zoning Bylaw 
survived zoning amendments made in 1953.
87
 However, by 1967, stables were prohibited within 
the city limits, even in the urban agricultural zones or in future urban development zones.
88
 As 
discussed in the following section, there is some indication that the city intended this change as a 
means of prohibiting livestock in the city.  
2.3 Modern Agricultural Policy  
The Global Food System 
Henry Bernstein, a professor emeritus at the London School of Economics, and founding 
editor of the Journal of Agrarian Change from 2001-2008 describes trends in the global food 
system as follows:  
 the increasing concentration of global corporations in both agri-input and agro-food 
industries;  
                                                 
85
 Andrea Gaynor, Harvest of the Suburbs (Perth: University or Western Australia Press, 2006) 
[Andrea Gaynor]. 
86
 Ibid at page 113.  
87
 City of Saskatoon, Zoning Bylaw No 3307, July 1953. 
88
 City of Saskatoon, Zoning Bylaw No 4637, May 1967.  
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 the growth of obesity and obesity-related illness, together with continuing, possibly 
growing, hunger and malnutrition; 
 the environmental costs of all of the above, including loss of biodiversity, increasing 
levels of fossil-fuel use and their associated carbon emissions
89
 
The modern era of agricultural policy is characterized by deepening global supply chains
90
 
and a dominance of supermarkets.
91
 The influence of transnational corporations and their ability 
to achieve favorable local policies,
92
 including subsidies,
93
 is pervasive. Notably, the economic 
concentration held by agricultural firms tends to be increasing.
94
 In Canada this results in big 
farms are getting bigger. In contrast, the number of small farms is also increasing. The family or 
middle size farm, however, is disappearing.
95
 The increasing economic concentration of 
                                                 
89
 Henry Bernstein, “Food Sovereignty: A Skeptical View”, Food Sovereignty: A Critical 
Dialogue International Conference, Program in Agrarian Studies at Yale University and the 
Journal of Peasant Studies, September 14-15, 2013, 
online:<www.yale.edu/agrarianstudies/foodsovereignty/pprs/1_Bernstein_2013.pdf > at 2-3 
citing Henry Bernstein, Class dynamics of agrarian change (Halifax, NS, 2010: Fernwood) at 
82-84.  
90
 See e.g. Lawrence Busch, “Performing the Economy, Performing Science: From Neoclassical 
to Supply Chain Models In the Agrifood Sector”, Economy and Society 2007, 36(3):439-468. 
91
 McMichael, supra note 82 at 142.  
92
 See e.g. Diana Stuart & Michelle Worosz’s,“Risk, Anti-Reflexivity, and Ethical Neutralization 
in Industrial Food Processing”, 2012, Agriculture and Human Values 29(3):287-301. See also 
Grace Skogstad, Internationalization and Canadian Agriculture (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2008) in chapter 2, which discusses the role of farmer and NGO lobbyists. 
93Evan Fraser and Elizabeth Fraser, “10 things you need to know about the global food system”, 
1 May 2014, the Guardian, online: <www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/food-blog/10-
things-need-to-know-global-food-system>, [Fraser].   
94
 William H. Friedland “Agrifood Globalization and Commodity Systems.” International 
Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food, 2004 12: 5-16. Michael Carolan, The Sociology 
of Food and Agriculture (London: Routledge, 2012) at 40 [Carolan]. See also John Wilkinson, 
“The Globalization fo Agribusiness and Developing World Food Systems in Fred Magdoff & 
Brian Tokar, Agriculture and Food in Crisis: Conflict, Resistance, and Renewal (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 2010) 155-169, at 157-159.  
95
 André Magnan, “New Avenues of Farm Corporatization in the Prairie Grains Sector: Farm 
Family Entrepreneurs and the Case of One Earth Farms.” Agriculture and Human Values 2012 
29:161-175 at page 165.  
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agricultural firms occurs in contrast and tension with movements that take on various forms of 
localism discussed more below.  
The themes of the global agricultural system identified by Bernstein also typify the poultry 
industry.
96
 In the early 1990s, chicken surpassed beef and pork as the most consumed animal in 
America.
97
 The number of chicken farmers has decreased by 98% since 1950
98
 meaning that 
chicken farm sizes have increased dramatically. Growers are rarely independent and work for 
few companies who typically also sell the feed used by the growers.
99
 This also creates 
environmental issues as waste is concentrated in specific geographic locations.
100
 
Many of the counter trends to the capitalization of agriculture also caught hold during this 
period of agricultural intensification. One of the earlier local events includes the opening of 
Saskatoon Farmers’ market in 1975.101 One author suggests that “the movement to farmers 
markets can be seen arising from three aspects of the environmental movement – the desire for 
fresher foods, concern over the use of pesticides and a desire for energy savings by shortening 
the supply chain.”102  
                                                 
96
 See e.g. Francisco Martinez-Gomez, Gilberto Aboites-Manrique & Douglas H. Constance, 
“Neoliberal restructuring, neoregulation, and the Mexican poultry industry”, Agric Hum Values 
(2013) 30:495–510. 
97
 Pew environmental, supra note 80 at 1.  
98
 Ibid at page 3.  
99
 Ibid at page 4-5.  
100
 Ibid at page 9-16.  
101
 Micheal Basil, “A history of farmers’ markets in Canada.” Journal of Historical Research in 
Marketing, 2012, Vol 4 No 3, 387-407 at 396. 
102
 Ibid, internal citations omitted.  
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Urban Agriculture Revival 
The United Nations defines Urban Agriculture as “the production of food and nonfood 
plant and tree crops, and animal husbandry, both within and fringing urban areas.”103 The term 
urban agriculture has only recently emerged into the popular lexicon,
104
 although the practice of 
urban gardening and micro-livestocking is ancient and has persisted through time, space and 
social context.
105
  
Urban agriculture can be characterized by different modes of organization and 
management, scale, function and purpose, labour and market engagement.
106
 In Saskatoon, urban 
agriculture is often used to describe residential gardens, community allotment plots (e.g. City 
Park Community Garden
107
), collective community gardens (e.g. Riversdale community 
                                                 
103
 Rod MacRae et al. “Could Toronto provide 10% of its fresh vegetable requirements from 
within its own boundaries? Matching consumption requirements with growing spaces”. Journal 
of Agriculture, Food Systems, and Community Development, 2010 1(2): 105–127 at page 106. 
See also : Luc J.A. Mougeot, “Urban agricutlutre: Definition, presence, potential and risks”, 1-
42 in Bakker et al (eds.). Growing Cities, Growing Food: Urban Agriculture on the Policy 
Agenda: A Reader on Urban Agriculture (Feldafing, Germany, 2010: German Foundation for 
International Development) at 10. Mougeot offers criteria to determine whether an activity can 
be described as urban agriculture, such as: the use of urban residents for labour, the use of 
urban resources (e.g. waste as compost and water for irrigation), links with urban consumers, 
impacts on urban ecology (both positive and negative), competition for land with other urban 
functions, and the influence of urban policies and plans. 
104
 UN FAO  “Urban agriculture: an oximoron? In: The state of food and agriculture 1996”, 
UNFAO, Rome, 1996 43-57; Jac Smit, Joe Nasr and Annu Ratta, Urban Agriculture: Food, 
Jobs and Sustainable Cities, 2001, The Urban Agriculture Network, Inc. [Smit] 
105
 Smit, ibid at page 10. Paris in the early 1800s had 8,500 urban farmers cultivating 
approximately one sixth of the city’s land area. Paris is often credited by some for developing  
“square-foot gardening”, a technique still used by many today. See e.g Cockrall-King, Jennifer, 
Food and the City: Urban Agriculture and the New Food Revolution (Amherst, NY: 
Prometheus Books 2010) at page 90.  
106
 Nathan McClintock, “Radical, reformist, and garden-variety neoliberal: coming to terms with 
urban agriculture's contradictions”, Local Environment: The International Journal of Justice 
and Sustainability, 201419:2, 147-171 at page 150.  
107
 City of Saskatoon, “Current Allotment, Community, and Backyard Gardens in Saskatoon”, 
September 2013, online: City of Saskatoon 
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garden
108
), informal or guerilla gardening on boulevards and other non-allocated spaces, non-
profit gardens (e.g. Saskatoon Food Bank’s Garden Patch109), commercial operations (e.g. Spin 
Farming
110
 and EcoBain Farms
111
), and the keeping of backyard chickens (as in the case of 
Deborah Johnson and others).  
Generally speaking, Western urban dwellers are significantly disconnected from the 
production of their food, largely in response to the international restructuring of agribusiness and 
the associated commodification of food.
112
 Urban agriculture can assist in reconnecting urban 
dwellers with their food production, and nature more generally.
113
 This sort of reconnection is 
noted in the literature as providing significant physical, mental,
114
 and for some, even spiritual 
benefits.
115
 Urban agriculture also assists urban consumers in developing and maintaining food 
producing and processing skills that are quickly being lost in the context of greater consumption 
                                                                                                                                                             
<www.saskatoon.ca/DEPARTMENTS/Community%20Services/Communitydevelopment/Doc
uments/Garden_Locations.pdf>. 
108
 Ibid; See also CHEP, “Backyard Gardening Program”, online: 
<www.chep.org/en/programs/backyardgardeningprogram> 
109
 Saskatoon Food Bank and Learning Centre, “Urban Agriculture – Garden Patch”, online: 
<saskatoonfoodbank.org/gardenpatch/> 
110
 Wally’s Urban Market Garden, “Vive La Niche”, SPIN Farming, 15 September 2014, online: 
<spinfarming.com/tips/tag/sk/>. 
111
 Jenn Sharp “Brian and Roberta Bain are farming for the future” The Leader Post, 14 January 
2014, online: Leader Post 
<www.leaderpost.com/life/Brian+Roberta+Bain+farming+future/9385521/story.html> 
112
 Bethaney Turner, “Embodied connections: sustainability, food systems and community 
gardens”, Local Environment: The International Journal of Justice and Sustainability, (2011) 
16:6, 509-522 at 511.  
113
 Ibid. See also at Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, “Cultivating Questions for a Sociology of 
Gardens”, Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 2010 39: 498 at 499.  
114
 See e.g. Nathan McClintock, “Why farm the City?” Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy 
and Society 2010, 3, 191-207.  
115
 Ibid. See also Melissa Raphael, “At the East End of Eden: A Feminist Spirituality of 
Gardening: Our Way Past the Flaming Sword”, Feminist Theology 1993 2:101.  
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of fast and easy food.
116
 Saskatoon’s prohibition on micro-livestock thereby misses an important 
opportunity, not only for increased urban agricultural activity, but also social wellbeing.  
Kouri Research, a local policy consultancy, completed a report focused on local and 
regional food system trends, which suggested that Saskatoon is an increasingly educated and 
food conscious population.
117
 The number of community gardens is steadily increasing to fulfill 
a growing demand for locally produced food.
 118
 Moreover, Kouri’s report suggests that 
Saskatoon has a significant opportunity to grow more food locally, having an estimated 2,500 
acres of vacant land, most of which consists of parks.
119
 It is estimated that 50-75% of 
Saskatoon’s food needs could be met by local and regional production without Saskatoonians 
having to significantly having to change their diet.
120
 
If the prevalence of community gardening is any indication of the prevalence of urban 
micro-livestocking, then recent trends would suggest that the latter is on the rise.  In Saskatoon, 
the number of community gardens has increased from 12 to 32 since 2008.
121
 The increase in 
community gardens during this time coincides with the increase in global food prices during 
2007/2008 and with a growing awareness of the energy consumed in the conventional 
agricultural system. The growing prevalence of community gardens should come as no surprise 
                                                 
116
 See generally JoAnn Jaffe and Michael Gertler, “Victual vicissitudes: Consumer deskilling 
and the (gendered) transformation of food systems” Agriculture and Human Values (2006) 23: 
143–162  
117
 Kouri Research, supra note 43 at iv. 
118
 Ibid at page 22.  
119
 Ibid at page 23.  
120
 Ibid at page 19.  
121
City of Saskatoon. “Community Garden Locations”, website:  
<www.saskatoon.ca/DEPARTMENTS/Community%20Services/Communitydevelopment/Docu
ments/Garden_Locations.pdf>". 
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given that gardening is one Canadians’ favorite pastimes.122 This is highlighted by unpublished 
2011 survey data from Statistics Canada, which suggests that 80% of surveyed households “have 
a garden or areas with trees, shrubs, flowers or vegetables outside.” The survey results found that 
56% of households “grew vegetables, herbs, fruits or flowers for personal use”,123 indicating a 
prevalence of self-sustaining tendencies among Canadians.
124
  
The energy and interest in local food growing is further manifested in the wave of urban 
municipalities creating local food system policy frameworks.
125
 Saskatoon has yet to move 
towards creating such a policy framework, notwithstanding the adoption in principle of the 
Saskatoon Food Charter,
 126
 which is discussed more in Chapter 3’s section on “Food 
Sovereignty”. While it may be difficult to estimate how food trends would change if micro-
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Planning Association, November 2012, online: 
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livestocking was permitted in Saskatchewan – the province with the highest provincial rate of 
volunteerism
127
 – the direct and indirect impacts, at least in theory, could be appreciable. 
  
                                                 
127
 Statistics Canada, Mireille Vézina and Susan Crompton, “Volunteering in Canada”,23 April 
2014, online: <www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-008-x/2012001/article/11638-eng.htm>. 
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CHAPTER 3 -  THE THEORY OF FOOD RIGHTS IN CANADA 
 
In Mr. Hughes’ testimony at trial, and to the media,128 he framed his case as the “Canadian 
Right to Food Trial”.129  In so doing, Mr. Hughes suggested that there is something so 
fundamentally important about keeping urban hens that it was outside the scope of government 
action to prohibit this activity. This Chapter briefly explores how some of the social and 
environmental rights-based frameworks assists in contextualizing the objective or subjective 
beliefs of Mr. Hughes or other potential claimants who argue against restrictive urban 
agricultural laws.  
3.1 Climate Justice 
Climate injustice describes how the most marginalized groups, and concurrently the lowest 
carbon emitters, are disproportionately impacted by climate change.
130
  The reduction of 
agricultural emissions and sustainable agricultural alternatives are at the forefront of climate 
justice initiatives.
131
 Urban agriculture and localized modes of food production are often put 
forward as measures to mitigate and adapt to climate change and other associated issues such as 
local and global deteriorations in biodiversity and soil fertility. While there are many 
environmental dimensions of agriculture, this work considers only the narrow argument that 
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climate change should be taken into consideration when evaluating the acceptability of urban 
agricultural solutions as measure of climate change mitigation. These considerations are 
especially important in Saskatchewan, given that Saskatchewan is the most intensive producer of 
greenhouse gases per capita in Canada.
132
 
Empirical basis for Climate Justice 
The USDA says that “climate change poses unprecedented challenges to U.S. agriculture 
because of the sensitivity of agricultural productivity.” They predict that “major adjustments in 
production practices over the next 30 years” 133 will be required. Even more stark, if emission 
levels continue to rise unchecked, the conditions for human habitation on earth are at risk.
134
 
Former U.S. Secretary of Energy and Nobel Prize winning physicist Steven Chu said, “I don't 
think the American public has gripped in its gut what could happen… We're looking at a 
scenario where there's no more agriculture in California… I don't actually see how they can keep 
their cities going either.”135 Globally, agriculture and its associated impacts on land, such as 
deforestation, account for upwards of 25% of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.
136
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In some regions, the potential for agricultural production may increase over the short term 
as a result of longer and warmer growing seasons.
137
 Over time, however, the potential for 
greater yields will be challenged by yield-reducing risk factors. Regardless of any measures 
taken to reduce climate change in the future, by the end of the 21
st
 century, weather will be even 
more characterized by the extremes; there is a very likely going to be more regular and intense 
flooding
138
 and there is likely going to be more intense and lengthy droughts.
139
 Given that 
agriculture’s reliance on water,140 hydrological fluctuations will challenge agricultural 
production. Some empirical evidence already exists to suggest that some of these changes are 
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decomposition, synthetic fertilizers and rice patty emissions, all of which account for 10-12% 
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trends, pledges and their implementation, 2013, United Nations Environment Programme 
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already taking effect on the prairies.
141
 Warmer weather and eco-systems stressed by changing 
climatic conditions may also increase the risk of pests and biodiversity loss.
142
  
The scientific opinion is that global warming must be limited to 1.5°C to 2°C in order to 
avoid dangerous climate change,
143
 which means, according to the International Energy Agency, 
that “no more than one-third of proven reserves of fossil fuels can be consumed prior to 2050 if 
the world is to achieve the 2 °C goal.”144 All of this is to say quite simply that: the agriculture 
sector is a significant source of greenhouse gas emissions; greenhouse gas emissions, the cause 
of climate change, will have near and far reaching impacts; and, that to avoid the potentially 
stark consequences of climate change, greenhouse gas emissions need to be significantly reduced 
or eliminated in the near term.  Agricultural reform is an urgent and important matter.  
Climate Justice and Urban Agriculture 
Urban agriculture will be part of the solution to climate justice. It is largely intuitive that 
produce grown on intensively labored backyard plots would likely have less embodied carbon 
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emissions than industrially produced food grown thousands of miles away. It is often argued, 
however, that transportation accounts for a relatively minor portion of the lifecycle carbon 
emissions associated with most industrially grown produce.
145
 While a greenhouse gas 
accounting comparison between eggs or meat from urban hens and industrially produced hens is 
outside the scope of this work, it is noted that low energy alternatives are available for backyard 
chickens, such as passive solar coops.  In an effort to reduce emissions, it often matters far more 
what you eat than where it was grown.
146
 This has led some to choose vegetarianism and for 
those who do not wish to cut meat from their diet, to choose to eat chicken, eggs or fish over 
industrially produced beef as more climate friendly choices.
147
  
While the City of Saskatoon has acknowledged the issue of climate change, it has yet to 
implement budgetary commitments that would reduce greenhouse gas emissions in amounts 
called for by the IPCC.
148
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3.2 Food Rights 
Food rights, food sovereignty and food security frameworks aim to ensure that everyone 
has enough food to eat. Rights based paradigms are also concerned with the economic and social 
interests of the producers, as well as the rights of consumers to quality and nutritious food.  
Global to Local Food Security 
The Rome Declaration on World Food Security and the World Food Summit Plan of 
Action of 1996 described food security as existing “when all people at all times have access to 
sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life.”149 Notwithstanding 
continued efforts by nations to achieve food security, starvation and food insecurity persist.  
There is enough food to feed the world’s population, yet over 800 million suffer from 
chronic hunger.
150
 In 2000, 36 million people died from causes linked directly or indirectly to 
undernourishment and hunger.
151
 In 2007 and 2008, millions took to the streets to protest rising 
food prices while “agribusinesses were riding a wave of near-record profits”.152 These are major 
shortfalls of the global food system. 
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In 1981, political philosopher Amartya Sen highlighted that resolving food insecurity is 
more complex than simply producing more food; it requires concern for  “distribution, 
empowerment, entitlement, nutritional value, and the ability to withstand socio-economic and 
political instabilities”.153 Much of the food that is produced is spoiled before it reaches the 
consumer
154
 and an increasing proportion of agriculture production is undertaken to produce 
animal feed (at much lower return per kCal)
155
 and biofuels.
156
 Further, many of the calories 
consumed across the globe are increasingly “empty” calories, resulting in increasing rates of 
diabetes, obesity and among other nutritional concerns.
157
 Empty calories are generally less 
expensive; accordingly, obesity is transpiring as a new function of poverty and food 
insecurity.
158
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In 2012, Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter, visited Canada and 
produced a report outlining Canada’s performance in relation to the Right to Food.159 Given that 
the availability and access to food is often a function of poverty, De Schutter considered some of 
Canada’s economic indicators. 160  He found that 7.7 % of households in 2007/08 experienced 
moderate or severe food insecurity; one in ten families with a child under six were food 
insecure;
161
 and, approximately 900,000 Canadians accessed food banks.
162
  
The report completed by Kouri Research, follows a series of previous reports that delineate 
Saskatoon’s food deserts (areas without access to supermarkets, and consequently, access to less 
nutritious food).
163
 As Kouri’s report highlights, urban agriculture as a part of local and regional 
production also plays an important role in food policy and minimizing food insecurity. In the 
2013 growing season, the Saskatoon Food Bank’s garden patch produced approximately 19,000 
pounds of food.
164
 The garden also provided 500 people with an opportunity to learn gardening 
techniques, which could foreseeably increase food production at other locations by having a 
more skilled population.  
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Justiciability of the Right to Food 
Food rights discourse ties food security to globally supported norms and treaties.
165
 Canada 
is a signatory to several international treaties that recognize the right to adequate food, such as 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UNICESCR)
166
 Many 
modern constitutional texts such as the Charter of Rights and Freedoms have their roots in these 
treaties.
167
 In Canada, Saskatchewan was the first to implement legislation reciting provisions 
akin to such treaties with Saskatchewan Human Rights Code.
168
 
Article 11 of UNICESCR recognizes the right of everyone to “an adequate standard of 
living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing”.169 UNICESCR 
also recognizes the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger and that nation-states 
shall take measures to improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food “by 
disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by developing or reforming agrarian 
systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural 
resources.”170 Strict compliance with the latter would leave little room to prohibit safe and 
effective urban agricultural practices, such as urban hen keeping.  
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UNICESCR provides an unambiguous agreement to reduce hunger. Notwithstanding the 
treaty’s laudable goals to reduce hunger, the justiciability of the treaty is questioned. Mr. De 
Schutter has expressed concerns about the “the growing gap between Canada’s international 
human rights commitments and their implementation domestically”.171 
Former UN special rapporteur on the right to food, Jean Ziegler, suggests that some people 
object on conceptual and theoretical grounds to the justiciability of the right to food for the 
following reasons:  
[F]irstly, the right to food was imprecise; secondly, the right to food was subject to the 
limit of progressive realization; thirdly, the right to food required resources to be 
provided; and fourthly, that, in the absence of precise national legislation on the right to 
food, it was difficult for the judiciary to fill the gap that properly belonged to the 
legislative branch of the State. All these arguments have been used in the past to suggest 
that the right to food could not be justiciable.
172
 
Economic, social and cultural rights are often characterized as “positive rights”, meaning 
that the state is required to do something in order to recognize the rights. Positive rights are often 
seen as political goals as opposed to enforceable rights. They are associated with state goodwill 
to be balanced with other competing goals as opposed to binding legal obligations. In contrast, 
civil and political rights (i.e. freedom and liberties) are often characterized as “negative rights”, 
meaning that the state is limited in stopping people from exercising such rights.
173
 Urban 
agriculture is likely an instance where a cultural and social right could characterize the right as a 
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positive or negative right, given that it relates to the aspiration for food security, but is also 
related to an activity restricted by government.  
In Canada, the right to food is treated primarily as a political goal aside from cases of child 
neglect. Specifically, it is a crime to fail to provide the necessities of life for one’s children. In 
defending our implementation of UNICESCR, Canada has suggested the following:  
[w]hile the guarantee of security of the person under section 7 of the Charter might not 
lead to a right to a certain type of social assistance, it ensured that persons were not 
deprived of the basic necessities of life.
174
 
The advent of the Charter marked the entrenchment of many of the values and norms 
contained in international treaties, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
175
 and 
UNICESCR,
176
 although, the Charter itself does not contain any substantive provisions 
protecting the right to food.
177
 Even without the Charter, it is a principle of Canadian law that 
“international human rights norms constitute persuasive sources for constitutional and statutory 
interpretation”.178 However, as noted above, the government’s interpretation of UNICESCR, is 
that there is no substantive right to food in Canada. The courts’ have effectively followed this 
interpretation as well.
179
 According to some scholars, Canada alongside Argentina, Comoros and 
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Yemen, has the lowest level of constitutional protection of the right to food
180
 as Canada has no 
legislative protections or case law explicitly recognizing the right to food.
181
  
Food Sovereignty 
Food sovereignty is a rights-based approach
182
 to organizing food systems at local and 
international levels. Drawing on the concepts of food security and the right to food, food 
sovereignty challenges the conventional model of agricultural trade, which favours export-
oriented and industrial agriculture and “displaces peasant and family agriculture.”183  
According to Ziegler, “the right to food … provides an important legal basis for the fight for 
food sovereignty.”184  
The concept of food sovereignty was popularized by groups such as La Via Campesina in 
1996 and further in 2007 during the Forum for Food Sovereignty, held in S lingu , Mali. The 
final declaration of the Forum for Food Sovereignty reads:  
Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food 
produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define 
their own food and agriculture systems. It puts those who produce, distribute and 
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consume food at the heart of food systems and policies rather than the demands of 
markets and corporation.
185
 
Food sovereignty prioritizes “food production for domestic and local markets, based on 
peasant and family farmer diversified and agro-ecologically based production systems”186 as well 
as fair prices for producers, access and community control over land and other environmental 
resources, promotion of gender equality, protecting genetic (seed) diversity, and public 
investment in sustainable food systems.
187
 As summarized by Jean Ziegler, food sovereignty 
envisions a decentralization of the power and resources within the food system:  
Food sovereignty also embodies a call for greater access to resources by the poor, 
especially women, challenging what is perceived as a growing concentration of 
ownership of resources. … Food sovereignty calls for equitable access to land, seeds, 
water, credit and other productive resources so that people can feed themselves.
188
 
During De Shutter’s visit to Canada, he suggested that the emergence of food policies in 
some jurisdictions, such as Toronto, as a positive trend. De Schutter suggests that “[s]uch 
participatory models of food system management deserve support from the provincial, territorial 
and federal levels, in order to integrate them into a national level framework.”189  
Annette Desmarais and Hannah Wittman, two of Canada’s foremost food sovereignty 
academics, suggest that there is a range of stakeholders using food sovereignty language in 
Canada. While the adoption of the framework is in its infancy in Canada, Desmarais and 
Wittman suggest that there is “a shared aim to reclaim a public voice in shaping the food system 
                                                 
185
 See eg.  Claire Provost, “La Via Campesina celebrates 20 years of standing up for food 
sovereignty”, The Guardian, 17 June 2013 citing the Declaration Of Nyéléni, 27 February 
2007, Nyéléni Village, Sélingué, Mali, online: nyeleni.org 
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and a growing convergence around ideals of social justice, environmental sustainability and 
diversity”190 among food sovereignty advocates. 
Incorporation and implementation of Food Sovereignty 
Food sovereignty is incorporated into the national legislation or Constitutional texts of 
Venezuela, Nicaragua, Senegal, Mali, Nepal, Ecuador, and, most recently, Bolivia.
191
 Of these 
countries that support food sovereignty at a constitutional or legislative level, there is a varying 
degree of implementation of the principle into justiciable law or policies. Following the 
incorporating the concept of food sovereignty into Venezuela’s constitution in 1999 and several 
national laws in 2008, the country has implemented extensive food sovereignty focused 
programs focused on “cooperatives, subsidized food distribution (Mecal and PDVAL), 
communal councils, land reform, and agroecology institutes and research.”192 Other countries, 
such as Bolivia, have incorporated the principle into their constitution with tangible 
implementation measures yet to be observed.
193
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14-15, 2013, online: 
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Other countries that are not listed above, such as the United States, provide examples 
where municipal governments have implemented food sovereignty ordinances. For example, 
there are approximately 10 towns in Maine that have implemented food sovereignty-like 
ordinances,
194
 some of which have resulted in legal battles where the ordinances conflict with 
state-level milk safety laws.
195
 Blue Hill, Maine, for example, passed a “Local Food and 
Community Self-Governance Ordinance” in 2011, exempting “producers and processors of local 
foods from state licensing and inspection requirements as long as their products are sold directly 
to consumers for personal consumption.”196  
At the state level, Wyoming has recently passed the bipartisan Food Freedom Act,
197
 which 
allows for the sale of “processed produce, poultry, eggs and unpasteurized milk direct from the 
cook or farmer”.198 Representative Lindholm, the bill’s sponsor, says “[t]his law will take local 
foods off the black market. It will no longer be illegal to buy a lemon meringue pie from your 
neighbor or a jar of milk from your local farm.”199 
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In Saskatchewan, First Nations are at the forefront of implementing food sovereignty 
projects. In 2009, Flying Dust First Nation began farming a twenty-acre plot, which provides 
fresh produce to Flying Dust and other First Nations using a community supported agriculture 
(CSA) model for distribution. It is also a source of formal education in horticulture, and employs 
18 people.
200
   
Food sovereignty research, organizing and support are advanced by organizations such as 
the National Farmers Union, who are notably one of the founding members of Via Campesina 
and actively involved internationally with food sovereignty and alternative trade.
201
 Food Secure 
Canada
202
 and the People’s Food Policy Project203 are two other groups involved in promoting 
food sovereignty related principles.  
The Saskatoon Food Bank’s garden patch, discussed above, is an excellent example of 
movement towards tangible implementation of Saskatoon’s Food Charter and local food 
sovereignty.
204
 Saskatoon’s Food Charter was adopted in principle by the City of Saskatoon in 
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 Paul Hanley, “Fist Nation Growing its Way to Food Sovereignty”, 12 March 2015, Star 
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2002.
205
 The charter includes objectives aligned with food sovereignty including: “the right of all 
residents to adequate amounts of nutritious, safe, accessible, culturally acceptable food”;  
“partnerships and programs that support rural-urban food links and the availability of locally 
grown”, and “protection of agricultural lands”.206 As such, the Food Charter is an important 
reference in claims such as those advanced by Mr. Hughes, although faces challenges of 
justiciability as it is adopted only in principle.
207
  
Other food rights frameworks 
Food sovereignty is similar to other food rights frameworks, such as food independence, 
food justice, and food democracy. Food independence advocates for “the right of the individual 
to exercise their personal judgment for the purpose of qualifying the food they eat”, and that the 
right “to secure their preferred food through peaceful, private contractual trade without 
permission from the majority.”208 Similarly, food justice, an urban and peri-urban agricultural 
advocacy platform, targets “the industrial agricultural and concentrated land ownership pattern, 
the exploitation of those who work the land or in the food production factories, and the hazards 
and inequities embedded in our dominant food growing and production system.”209 
Finally, according to Neva Hassanein, food democracy is the concept that “people can and 
should be actively participating in shaping the food system, rather than remaining passive 
                                                 
205
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spectators on the sidelines.... [It is about] citizens having power to determine agro-food policies 
and practices locally, regionally, nationally and globally.”210 
Summary 
What is consistent among these rights-based frameworks is that they contend with the 
status quo of how agriculture is organized. They provide an articulation of a desire to have a 
social and environmentally just food system, and how the current arrangement falls short.  Food 
sovereignty and the other alternative food rights frameworks are motivated by largely 
communitarian objectives seeking to “re-establish moral economies that are informed by a larger 
set of social and cultural values.”211 Accordingly, food rights solutions require local solutions, 
formulated in a global context. This form of reflexive localism encourages holistic analysis of 
food systems to ensure that the dogma of localism or organic is not being used to create or 
maintain social exclusion, economic inequality or injustice.
212
 Accordingly, the food-rights 
frameworks such as food sovereignty seek practical solutions premised on justice, equality, and 
fairness. What is distinctive about food systems that exist in tension with industrialized 
agriculture is that the relationships between the producer and consumer “are framed by 
‘fairness’”213 as opposed to economics.  
The question remains as to whether there are other justiciable measures to protect food 
rights under the Canada’s constitution. The following sections suggest that there are.  
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CHAPTER 4 -  MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY AND URBAN CHICKENS 
 
This chapter challenges the power of municipalities to prohibit the keeping of backyard 
hens on urban residential plots. This chapter begins with an overview of the scope of municipal 
jurisdiction. As discussed below, the scope of municipal jurisdiction is limited by the 
reasonableness standard and bad faith acts. These principles are then applied to the reasoning in 
R v Hughes and to Saskatoon’s Zoning Bylaw and Animal Control Bylaw. It is argued that the 
prohibition on urban chickens relies strongly on moral governance, a form of governance that is 
strictly beyond the scope of municipal government’s mandate. 
4.1 Overview of municipal power 
Source of municipal power 
The rule of law provides that “state power must be exercised in accordance with the 
law.”214 Municipalities do not hold any direct power under the Constitution; they possess only 
the powers that are delegated to them by provincial legislatures
215
 and the power implicit and 
necessary to achieve the purposes of municipal government.
216
 Accordingly, when municipalities 
make decisions or pass bylaws that extend beyond the legislative constraints imposed upon them, 
such decisions or bylaws “fall outside of the law,” and can be set aside by the courts.217  
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Municipalities’ delegated powers are broad, and their purpose expansive, providing them 
with significant deference from the courts
218
 and consequently, real discretionary power.
219
 
Deference is afforded to municipal decision-making, in part, because municipal councils are 
made up of elected representatives accountable to their constituents.
220
   
Scope of municipal power 
Marianna Valverde notes that “[f]ew legal scholars have reflected on the fact that only 
municipalities can force homeowners to fix up their yards, even if the risks to neighbors are 
purely aesthetic.”221 While municipal power is constitutionally delegated from provinces, it is 
often manifested to effect private property issues that provincial or federal levels of government 
might have difficulty regulating.  
Broad grants of power are often given to municipalities in the form of ‘omnibus’ clauses. 
These clauses are worded to include all matters falling within the spheres of health and safety or 
peace, order and good government.
222
 Examples of omnibus grants exist in Saskatchewan’s 
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Municipalities Act
223
 and Cities Act
224
, which provide for the power to pass bylaws for purposes 
expedient to: 
(a) the peace, order and good government of the municipality.  
(b) the safety, health and welfare of people and the protection of people and property; 
…225 
Examples of more explicit grants (although still quite broad) in the Municipalities and the 
Cities acts include the delegated authority to regulate:  
(d) nuisances, including property, activities or things that affect the amenity of a 
neighbourhood; … 
(k) wild and domestic animals and activities in relation to them;
226
 
Arguments could be made, as they were in Hughes’, that the power to regulate chickens 
could fall under any of the above listed delegations.  
Notwithstanding the great deference afforded to municipalities, “omnibus” grants do not 
confer unlimited power upon a municipality.
227
  Open-ended delegations, such as “to provide 
good government”228 do not permit municipalities to pass bylaws in bad faith, or that are 
unreasonable,
 229
 both of which are discussed in the following sections. While limited from 
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unreasonableness or bad faith decision-making, the powers of municipal laws often go 
unquestioned.  
Authority to Prohibit 
In Saskatchewan, municipalities and cities can pass bylaws that “regulate or prohibit” 230 
matters that fall within the municipality’s or city’s jurisdiction. Given that municipally 
sanctioned prohibitions are not uncommon or unlawful in Saskatchewan, the prohibitive nature 
of the impugned bylaws alone would not provide a remedy to litigants combatting the validity of 
the bylaws. However, the prohibitive nature of a bylaw may give some indication as to the 
bylaw’s purpose or underlying moral foundation.  
Other jurisdictions do not give municipalities the power to prohibit land uses unless 
specifically authorized to do so by statute. In Quebec, there is no delegated authority for 
municipalities to prohibit activities that are otherwise legal. For example, in Spraytech,
231
 a 
chemical company argued that a bylaw prohibiting the use of conventional pesticides for 
aesthetic use was outside the scope of the municipality’s jurisdiction. The Court found that the 
bylaw was not prohibitory in nature because it allowed organic pesticides to be used for aesthetic 
purposes, and therefore not outside the scope of the municipality’s jurisdiction.232  
In Dollard-des-Ormeaux (City of) c. Sasson
233
, the prosecution of the accused who was 
ticketed for playing street hockey was dismissed. The municipal court provided that the City had 
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the “power to regulate the playing of street-hockey in a manner so as to guarantee safety.”234 It 
did not, however, have the power to absolutely prohibit such activity. This case highlights how 
municipalities should consider reasonable alternatives to achieving the purpose of the legislation 
(in this case, safety) when exercising powers that restrict liberty.   
Unreasonableness Limitation 
In the context of this work, the unreasonableness limitation has very little application
235
 
given that section 322 of The Cities Act
236
 provides that “[n]o bylaw or resolution enacted in 
good faith may be challenged on the ground that it is unreasonable.”237 However, the test for 
unreasonableness is reviewed in order to enable future litigants in another jurisdiction to better 
articulate why the bylaw should be set aside.  
At common law, municipal decisions cannot be unreasonable, although context specific 
meaning of reasonableness or the reasonable person is elusive. American scholar of 
Administrative Law, Kenneth Culp Davis, suggests that the exercise of administrative 
discretionary decision-making “may mean either beneficence or tyranny, either justice or 
injustice, either reasonableness or arbitrariness.”238 A determination of reasonableness always 
contains an element of bias and subjectivity of the person making the determination.  Against the 
backdrop of broad municipal power enforced by a slippery concept of reasonableness, it is not 
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surprising that Valverde determines, “the most striking feature of the law at the local level is its 
heterogeneity and lack of clear organizing rationales”.239  
The test for unreasonableness articulated by the Supreme Court in Catalyst Paper Corp. v 
North Cowichan (District)
240
 provides that a bylaw will be set aside if it is one that no 
reasonable body would implement the bylaw when informed by the broad social, economic and 
political issues that could be considered by elected municipal counselors.
241
 This test has roots in 
century old case law, where unreasonableness describes municipal acts that are aberrant or 
overwhelming,
242
 involving “such oppressive or gratuitous interference with the rights of those 
subject to them as could find no justification in the minds of” 243 a reasonable person.244  
The test in Catalyst Paper also follows the ruling Dunsmuir v New Brunswick,
245
 where the 
Supreme Court of Canada articulated the qualities of unreasonableness: 
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[R]easonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency 
and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with 
whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are 
defensible in respect of the facts and law.
246
 [emphasis added] 
That a bylaw affects one person’s business or land-use interests more harshly than 
another’s is insufficient for determining that it is unreasonable.247 The Supreme Court of Canada 
has long held that zoning bylaws are inherently discriminatory, and as such, certain types of 
discrimination are permitted.
248
  For example, section 8(3)(b) of The Cities Act, provides cities in 
Saskatchewan with the power to “deal with developments, activities, industries, businesses or 
things in different ways, and, in so doing, to divide each of them into classes or subclasses, and 
deal with each class or sub-class in different ways.”249 
Given that bylaws are allowed to be unreasonable in Saskatchewan, more is needed than a 
simple oppressive or gratuitous interference.  
Bad Faith and Invalid Purpose Limitation 
Municipalities hold power in relation to a broad scope of regulatory purposes. In Shell 
Canada Products Ltd. v Vancouver (City),
250
 Sopinka J. for the majority held that the purpose of 
municipal government is to render services to residents “with a view to advancing their health, 
welfare, safety and good government.”251 These purposes are also found in Saskatchewan’s 
Municipalities and Cities acts.
252
 Notwithstanding the broad scope of municipal governance, 
municipalities are limited from bad faith reasoning, which includes passing legislation for an 
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invalid purpose. An invalid purpose is held to be one that is outside the jurisdiction of the 
municipality,
 253
 which includes, inter alia, moral reasoning.  
In Prince George (City) v Payne
254
 the Supreme Court of Canada overturned the licensing 
refusal of an adult boutique because the refusal was found to be motivated by moral 
considerations. Dickson C.J., (as he was then) for the Court held that it was outside the 
municipality’s discretion to refuse to license the adult boutique on moral, and therefore 
extraneous, grounds.
255
 Dickson C.J. stressed that it was not the Court’s task to consider the 
wisdom of the council’s decision, but rather, to assess whether it fell within the four corners of 
the council’s jurisdiction.256  Of course, as mentioned above in relation to the discussion of 
unreasonableness above, the Court can assess the unreasonableness of an administrative 
decision, although municipalities are often provided great deference.  
In Xentel DM Inc. v Windsor (City)
257
 the Ontario Superior Court quashed an anti circus 
bylaw.
258
 The city suggested that the purpose of the bylaw was to protect the public from animal 
attacks.
259
 However, upon review the Court found that the intentions in passing the bylaw were 
marred by the City’s desire to protect the animals, not the public.260 Council had recently been 
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lobbied extensively by animal rights groups,
261
 and were given legal advice that the bylaw would 
pass muster if it was passed under the banner of the protection of the public.
262
 The Court 
reasoned “the process by which Council reached its decision to ban the performance of exotic 
animals was marked by the absence of frankness and impartiality, which are indicia of good 
faith.”263 
The decisions in Prince George (City) v Payne and Xentel highlight that the process and 
rationale for municipal decision-making matters greatly if not more than the substance of 
municipal decisions. Both cases relied on evidence of the city’s intentions that were revealed 
during the process of enabling the bylaws, not intentions that were necessarily apparent on the 
plain text reading of the bylaw. Accordingly, the rule against moral reasoning consigns 
municipalities with instrumental or utilitarian management of municipal purposes as opposed to 
moral, religious or ideological reasoning. As such, the municipal decisions in Prince George 
(City) v Payne and Xentel would likely have been upheld but for the lack of reasoning pertaining 
the communities’ benefit in health, welfare, safety or good government. Empirical evidence 
pertaining to municipal purposes, therefore, is important to the defence of municipal decisions. 
This is because lack of evidence relating to a municipal purpose may suggest moral as opposed 
to empirical or logic-based decision making premises.   
The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal recently reviewed the law on bad faith and invalid 
purpose in Duffield v Prince Albert (City),
264
 a case where the appellant sought to quash a bylaw 
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that prohibited taxi drivers from driving their taxicabs through drive-thru liquor outlets.
265
 The 
purpose of the bylaw was found to be “to mitigate the safety risks to taxicab operators arising 
from their patrons’ use of drive-thru off-sale liquor outlets … [or] to prevent individuals from 
using taxicabs to circumvent existing requirements of provincial regulation governing the sale of 
alcohol.”266 
 At paragraph 15, the Court adopted passages from Stanley Makuch, Neil Craik and Signe 
Leisk’s, Canadian Municipal and Planning Law,267 which provide that “the term “bad faith” can 
also characterize conduct which is unreasonable, arbitrary and without the degree of fairness, 
openness and impartiality required of a municipal council.”268 Further, “in cases where the 
evidence demonstrates a lack of candour or impartiality on council’s behalf, the courts have been 
willing to draw a negative implication that such behaviour indicates an ulterior purpose not 
related to the legitimate purpose of power granted.” Accordingly, findings of bad faith might be 
premised on arbitrariness, and lack of candour, and do not necessarily require positive evidence 
of deception as was admitted in Payne and Xentel.  
The passages adopted from Makuch, Craik and Leisk further explore the difference 
between the closely related concepts of bad faith and improper purpose:  
Unlike the bad faith doctrine, where a municipal enactment may prima facie appear valid 
(such as passing a zoning by-law), but loses its validity due to the improper motives of 
Council, a by-law which is passed for an improper or impermissible purpose is simply 
ultra vires, regardless of council’s motives.269 
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In short, improper purpose relates to the municipality exceeding their jurisdiction on the 
basis that the bylaw does not fit within the four corners of their delegated power, such as, where 
the municipality might be legislating vis-à-vis a strictly federal matter. Bad faith, however, 
concerns motives and provides an opportunity to attack otherwise intra vires legislation on the 
basis of its arbitrariness.  
Notwithstanding the opportunity to attack bylaws in relation to their purpose, the Court in 
Duffield reinforced the deference and “softer scrutiny” owed to municipal decision makers, as 
articulated by McLachlin J. (as she was then) in her dissent in Shell Canada.
270
  The court cites 
Professor Felix Hoehn’s explanation for McLauchlin J.’s softer scrutiny:   
First, she considered it important for local democracy that municipalities be able 
to reflect local values, and this requires that courts respect this responsibility. 
Second, it would avoid the costs and uncertainty associated with excessive 
litigation when municipalities have to defend the validity of the exercise of their 
powers. Third, it would be more consistent with municipalities’ expanding range 
of responsibilities, so they would not be confined “in the straight-jacket of 
tradition.
271
 
The approach, while practical in many respects, might be cautioned where the bylaw 
prohibits or reduces the opportunity to partake in otherwise legal activities. For example, the 
justification theory advocated by American constitutional scholar, Sonu Bedi
272
 holds that when 
it comes to questions of liberty, normative attention should be on the state to justify 
infringements.
273
 Bedi puts the onus on government to justify the reason or rationale for 
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acting.
274
  Applied in the context of this work, a municipality should bear some onus in justifying 
laws that restrict liberties.  
The established approach of softer scrutiny to municipal decision-making referenced in 
Duffield provides a significant barrier to litigants claiming improper purpose or bad faith 
reasoning. In addition to a lack of empirical evidence, a claimant would benefit from leading 
evidence pertaining to the arbitrariness of the municipal decision. As discussed in subsequent 
sections, the absence of empirical evidence and the illogical premises of Saskatoon’s decision to 
prohibit chickens is `suggestive of arbitrariness and moral reasoning. It is argued below that the 
arbitrary and misinformed empirical basis, as well as, comments coming from the mayor 
suggesting a moral impurity of housing chickens may be sufficient in establishing a claim based 
in invalid purpose and moral reasoning.  
4.2 Evaluation of jurisdiction to ban hens pursuant to Animal Control Bylaw 
This section evaluates the purpose of the Animal Control Bylaw and determines that the 
animal control bylaw is drafted in such a way that the inclusion of livestock does not relate to the 
purpose of the bylaw, and even if it did, the pith and substance of the bylaw does not relate to a 
municipal purpose; and further, that the bylaw relates to an improper purpose. Specifically, this 
section argues that the purpose of the bylaw does not relate to the regulation of health, safety, 
nuisance or animals, but rather, the purpose of the bylaw is to regulate urban farming and urban 
self-determination, and to prevent the immoral impurity of rural behavior from occurring within 
urban boundaries.  
                                                 
274
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Drafting of the Animal Control Bylaw 
As noted in section 2.1 above, hens are included in a list of otherwise exotic and wild 
animals in Schedule 5 of the Animal Control Bylaw. Also, the section 22(1) effectively 
prohibiting the keeping of Schedule 5 animals for micro-livestocking purposes falls under the 
heading of “Owning and Harbouring Exotic and Wild Animals”. While the headings are not 
intuitive and appear misplaced in relation to the regulation of chickens, this alone would likely 
not be detrimental to the validity of the bylaw. Saskatchewan’s The Interpretation Act, 1995,275 
provides that headings are not part of the legislation and have no legal meaning.
276
 However, the 
bylaw also has another flaw, namely, that the purpose section does not clearly appear to exert 
jurisdiction over livestock.  
Section 2 provides that the purpose of the Animal Control Bylaw is as follows: 
2. The purpose of this Bylaw is as follows: 
 
(a) to provide for the licensing of cats and dogs; 
(b) to control and regulate cats and dogs; 
(c) to provide for the impounding of cats and dogs that are at large; 
(d) to control and regulate pigeons; and 
(e) to control and regulate exotic and wild animals.
277
 
The purpose section articulates an intention to regulate cats, dogs, pigeons and wild and 
exotic animals. It is tenuous to see how chickens might fall within this list. The list is not open 
and does not suggest a fully sweeping intention to control all animals. The best argument that 
could be made to suggest that this bylaw is intended to apply to chickens would be to suggest 
that chickens are “wild animals”.  
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Chickens are often thought of as livestock, as was the determination in Smedley, above, 
where Campell J. found that chickens were “fowl” (fowl that were in every way inoffensive). 
The Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench used the following definition of livestock in R v 
Raycraft
278
 to establish that cows are livestock: 
[25] The appellants are correct in identifying a range of definitions of “livestock”. 
Definitions include: 
(a)      …. animals kept for domestic use but not as pets, esp on a farm” (Collins 
English Dictionary, Canadian Edition, 2005, HarperCollins Publishers); and 
(b) …. “Domestic animals generally; any animals kept or dealt in for use or 
profit” (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3d ed., 1973, Oxford University 
Press). 
There is a theme of thinking of livestock as domesticated animals, which runs in direct 
contrast to being exotic and wild.  
As noted in Chapter 2, livestock were added to Schedule No 5 of the Animal Control 
Bylaw in 2007. What is more likely than chickens being wild is that when amending the bylaw to 
include livestock in 2007, the city did not make any changes to its “purpose” section, and simply 
included hens in the list of otherwise “exotic and wild” animals.  
The Bylaw to amend the previous version of the Animal Control Bylaw was brought 
forward by the Development Services Branch on the following basis: 
From time to time, the Development Services Branch receives nuisance complaints about 
livestock and other animals being kept in residential areas. The ability to regulate the 
keeping of animals has become increasingly important due to concerns over the 
transmittal of disease, including Avian Influenza (Bird Flu). A recent court decision 
regarding one such enforcement file revealed a discrepancy between the Zoning Bylaw 
and the Animal Control Bylaw. For this reason, amendments to these bylaws are required 
in order to effectively manage livestock and domestic animals in all areas of the city.
279
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There are no records available from the office of the City Clerk to suggest that council 
reviewed any information other than the text above before amending the Animal Control Bylaw 
to prohibit chickens. An article from the local Star Phoenix provides the opinion of a local city 
planner that the restrictions stem from problems decades ago where some homeowners kept 
cows, pigs and chickens in their backyard.
280
 
The “recent court decision” referred to by the city in the above may have been the case of 
R v Morelli,
281
 where a Saskatoon man successfully defended against a ticket for keeping a pet 
sheep pursuant to Saskatoon’s zoning bylaws.282 The Court was not convinced that it was the 
intention of the zoning bylaw to prohibit sheep. It was a significant factor for the appellate Court 
in Morelli that the accused was not charged for having created a nuisance.
283
  
 The argument that the bylaw does not intend to regulate chickens might be futile for 
longer term change, given that the city could easily amend the bylaws to accord with any 
semantic shortfalls that exist.  
Prohibitive nature of the RPO and Animal Control Bylaw 
The purpose of the Animal Control Bylaw, as noted above, is to control, regulate, and 
impound cats and dogs;
284
 to control and regulate pigeons;
285
 and to “control and regulate wild 
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and exotic animals”.286 Further, as noted, the bylaw provides a list of prohibited animals in 
Schedule No. 5.  
There is a regulatory quality to the Animal Control Bylaw in that it permits some animals 
in the city – mostly for pets – while it only prohibits the pets and other animals listed in Schedule 
No. 5. This would be analogous to the Court’s reasoning in Spraytech where some pesticides 
were permitted, whereas others were suggested as posing undue risk. However, it should be 
remembered that the desired activity and use in Spraytech was the application of conventional 
pesticides for residential and aesthetic purposes. As organic pesticides were allowed the bylaw 
did not restrict residents from a means to their desired ends (i.e. they could use organic pesticides 
to control pests), but rather regulated how they ought to achieve their goals.
287
 The same cannot 
be said for the Animal Control Bylaw because it does not provide opportunity to grow animals 
for food in the city.  
Aside from the collection of honey, the Animal Control Bylaw prohibits residents from rearing 
livestock animals for food products or by products within the city. Accordingly, as with the 
Zoning Bylaw, the Animal Control Bylaw effectively prohibits the rearing of animals in the city 
for food provisioning purposes.   
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The assumed purpose of the RPO Bylaw in Hughes 
Mr. Hughes argued that the “City does not have the jurisdiction to regulate activity 
pertaining to household food [security], in this case exemplified by backyard chickens.”288 
Notice that Hughes’ argument is not that the City does not have the jurisdiction to regulate 
animals, or even urban hens, but rather that the City does not have the jurisdiction to regulate 
activities pertaining to household food security. This is a subtle but important distinction relating 
to an inquiry of the purpose of the bylaw.  
In R v Hughes, Skene J. found that the source of authority for the RPO Bylaw was 
Alberta’s Municipal Government Act,289 which states: 
A council may pass bylaws for municipal purposes respecting the following matters: 
(a) the safety, health and welfare of people and the protection of people and property;. . . 
(c) nuisances, including unsightly property; . . . 
 (h) wild and domestic animals and activities in 
relation to them;
290
 
This compares closely to Saskatchewan’s Municipalities and Cities acts, above, and 
describes the scope of municipal jurisdiction relating to the regulation or prohibition of animals 
in cities. The authority of Municipalities to act in relation to these purposes is not challenged, nor 
did it appear to be challenged by Mr. Hughes.  
After identifying the possible purposes of municipal bylaws – safety, health, nuisance and 
wild and domestic animals, Skene J. rightly considered whether the pith and substance of the 
bylaw fit within one of those heads of municipal jurisdiction. At paragraph 91 Skene J. finds that 
“the pith and substance of the RPO Bylaw, and in particular ss. 27 and 2(1)(n)(v) are valid 
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exercises of municipal powers being well within the jurisdiction of the City of Calgary, and fall 
under any or all of the above matters.”291  
With respect, Skene J.’s analysis of the pith and substance of the provisions is limited in 
depth and scope. It may be observed that Skene J. quite simply assumes that the pith and 
substance of the bylaws, or their purpose, relates to a municipal purpose because there is an 
assumed nexus between “chickens”, and the heads of power identified by Skene J., above. 
However, in the Xentel
292
 case, the anti-circus bylaw may have just as easily been assumed to 
relate to the valid head of jurisdiction of protection of public or regulation of animals. However, 
a closer look by the courts in that case revealed that the actual purpose was quite different from 
what the city thought the assumed purpose might be.   
Indicia of moral or improper reasoning  
In rejecting a bid to consider the softening of Saskatoon’s prohibition of chickens from 
residential areas, Saskatoon’s Mayor Don Atchison suggests: “"I just think that chickens belong 
in a rural setting, and if people want that... that's where they should be”293 Similarly, Councillor 
Eric Olauson suggested that people who want to raise chickens “should go live on a farm”.294 
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Councillor Olauson also suggested that City Hall would also somehow be liable for food-borne 
illnesses arising from the consumption of backyard eggs, or if chickens froze during the 
winter.
295
 He also suggested that chickens can be deadly.
296
 These claims were not empirically 
supported, and the liability of municipalities for livestock freezing or causing illness to its 
owners upon consumption of the animal does not appear to be a legal opinion, but rather a 
misinterpretation or speculation as to what the law might be. Another city counsellor equated the 
keeping of a few backyard chickens to the nuisance concerns caused by keeping hundreds of 
chickens.
 297
 One might anticipate during litigation that additional statements revealing moral 
reasoning in relation to this hen-keeping might become available through the disclosure of 
various documents from the city, such as committee meeting minutes or other transcribed 
material.  
Assuming for the moment that all of these comments are arbitrary and empirically false 
(which would require more expert opinion than I am able to provide) and do not disclose the 
requisite candour or impartiality, would that, alone, be sufficient to quash the Animal Control 
Bylaw? Challenging the bylaw based on the above may be possible, but would be supported by 
indicia of moral reasoning. In order to explore, whether comments of council disclose moral 
reasoning, an incredibly brief framework for contextualizing the discussion of moral reasoning is 
provided.  
Morality in the Oxford Dictionary of English defined as follows:  
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1. principles concerning right and wrong or good and bad behaviour matters of 
public/private morality.  
2. the degree to which something is right or wrong, good or bad, etc. according to moral 
principles.  
3. a system of moral principles followed by a particular group of people.298 
Jonathan Haidt, a social psychologist recently named as one of the world’s “top global 
thinkers”,299 suggests in his seminal work that “[m]orality is about more than harm and 
fairness”,300 suggesting that morality is also concerned with notions of “ingroup/loyalty, 
authority/respect, and purity/sanctity.”301 The latter, purity/sanctity, appear to relate to the phrase 
“moral welfare”302 which is often used in cases such as Payne, where the city was concerned 
over the licensing of an adult boutique. Absent credible concerns for health, safety, or nuisance, 
a prohibition tends to be based on moral reasoning. 
The keeping of chickens is not a case like R. v Malmo-Levine; R. v Caine,
303
 where a 
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the prohibition of possessing marijuana as a 
means of protecting those who may be particularly vulnerable to its consumption. In that case, 
the Court referenced expert evidence that characterized marijuana as a psychoactive drug that 
causes alteration of mental function.
304
 In relation to keeping chickens, a prohibition is consistent 
with favouring the city as a place of manicured uniformity. This type of moral reasoning would 
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not be legitimate even within criminal law, one of the more common forums that is legitimately 
concerned with moral welfare:  
Morality has traditionally been identified as a legitimate concern of the criminal law 
(Labatt Breweries, supra, at p. 933) although today this does not include mere 
“conventional standards of propriety” but must be understood as referring to societal 
values beyond the simply prurient or prudish.
305
   
The exclusion of chickens from the city, even if they are pets, is aligned with Valverde’s 
observation of the regulation of aesthetics in cities. According to Valverde, “urban aesthetic 
regulation does not only empower certain groups of persons. It also ranks activities and spaces 
along a kind of moral ‘chain of being’”.306 Chickens are not typically associated with courage or 
intelligence; they are feathered as opposed to furred, and in urban Saskatchewan, they are often 
associated with grandparents’ life on the farm.  From council’s perspective, chickens would not 
rank highly in relation to a manifesto focused on economic growth and prosperity. Rather, 
according to some councilors, chickens belong in the country, and if you want to keep chickens, 
so do you. This line of reasoning, absent a valid purpose, does not consider the pluralism of 
urban moral welfare, but rather falls squarely within “conventional standards of propriety”. In 
sum, the reasoning by city council tends to confirm Professor Andrea Gaynor’s observation that 
urban hen prohibitions relate closely to “a perceived out dated rural era in favor of a progressive 
urban ideology”307  
Claimants could argue that the focus of the prohibition on urban hens is based on a moral 
assumption that the desired purity of urban living requires that cities be aesthetically and socially 
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distinct from rural environments.
308
 The extremeness of prohibiting urban hens indicates that the 
reason for passing the bylaws is not for nuisance or health and safety related reasons, but rather 
for aesthetic or moral reasons.  While the Supreme Court has stated that bylaws can have more 
than one purpose,
309
 it is not evident from the sections that follow that the pith and substance of 
the prohibition would fit into the categories of nuisance or health and safety.  
4.3 No empirical evidence of nuisance and prohibiting backyard chickens in R v Hughes 
In 2006, the City of Calgary passed the RPO Bylaw banning livestock in residential areas. 
However, the bylaw consultation leading up to the enactment of the bylaw was largely concerned 
with the regulation of cats and dogs.
 310
  Testimony from Calgary’s Chief Bylaw Officer in 
Hughes provides that “there was no active concern, discussion or action with respect to the 
appropriateness or consistency of urban hens as pets and egg-layers in residential areas in the 
two years prior to the passing of the RPO Bylaw and the inclusion of chickens as prohibited 
livestock.”311 The Chief Bylaw Officer, Mr. Bruce, further testified that it was ultimately City 
Administration that determined that “keeping livestock in residential areas was inappropriate” 
and that the ban on chickens “probably more rightly belongs in Community Standards [Bylaw], 
but at the time, this [RPO] was the document open for amendment.”312 Accordingly, it was city 
administration, not the Chief Bylaw officer that determined that “[l]ivestock in the city, 
particularly residential areas, is generally inappropriate and creates nuisance issues.”313 
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In Hughes, the prosecution led no evidence that urban hens had ever caused a nuisance or 
that other hens had caused a nuisance since the passing of the bylaw.
314
 If this evidence existed 
in a reliable and persuasive form, one might reasonably assume that the prosecution would have 
presented this evidence. Even the City’s Chief Bylaw officer testified that “there was an absence 
of scientific research of the small backyard urban hen operation. The fear of harm and nuisance 
was speculative.”315  
Accordingly, prior to Mr. Hughes self-reporting his keeping of chickens and the ensuing 
prosecution of him for doing so, Mr. Bruce, with the assistance of local scientists and Mr. 
Hughes, designed a pilot project for the city of Calgary to measure the smell, odour, noise and 
health risks, if any, associated with urban chickens. The pilot project was ultimately turned down 
by the city’s policy committee and city council. No reasons were provided as to why the project 
should be rejected.
316
   
Justice Skene held that the impugned provisions of the RPO Bylaw were validly enabled 
under “safety, health and welfare of people; the protection of people and property; nuisances; 
and animals and activities in relation to them.”317 If Skene J. is correct, the same might 
reasonably be said for Saskatoon’s Animal Control Bylaw in relation to the provisions listed in 
the Municipalities or Cities Acts.    
Skene J’s judgment appears to follow this logic: The impugned bylaws regulate chickens. 
Chickens are animals. Therefore, the purpose of the bylaw is to regulate animals, in this case, 
chickens. Calgary has the authority to regulate animals. Therefore, the bylaws are within 
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Calgary’s jurisdiction. In short, the purpose is presumed from the sphere of jurisdiction to which 
it might relate. The reasoning is questionably circular, and certainly self-reinforcing.  
In any event, the merits of assuming that a chicken prohibition is unreasonable are 
discussed in the following sections. 
Avian Influenza 
In passing the prohibition on keeping urban chickens in Saskatoon pursuant to the Animal 
Control Bylaw, the Community Services Department cited concerns over Avian Influenza. While 
it is outside the scope of this paper to fully analyze the risk of avian influenza from backyard 
chickens in Saskatoon, the breadth of evidence reviewed suggests that the risk is negligible. 
Concerns over influenza might be overstated in consideration of the fact that there has never 
been a reported case of an urban backyard chicken having avian influenza, and the transmission 
of the disease occurs when animals are in contact with waterfowl or other infected chickens.
318
 
Urban chickens are very unlikely to come into contact with waterfowl or other infected chickens 
given that they are in an urban setting.  
Since 2013, the vast majority of cases of avian influenza occurred in China, and incidences 
of influenza are largely correlated with legal and illegal live chicken markets.
319
 More recently, 
there have been cases in B.C., but those correspond primarily to large corporate farms.
320
 The 
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risk exists but is lesser in smaller commercial or hobby farms.
321
 Sometimes governments and 
media will suggest that there are risks of avian influenza associated with “backyard chickens” 
but these risks are relate to peri-urban or rural flocks of dozens to hundreds of chickens.
322
 I was 
unable to find any reports of avian influenza in urban backyard chickens.  
Common sense dictates that there is a nexus between animals and human health and safety. 
There is also a nexus between people and human health and safety, quite a stronger one, but the 
balancing of interests prevents a prohibition on people. A nexus, while important, does not 
always mean that there is a real or sufficient danger to prohibit a certain activity, and the interests 
of others stakeholders also need to be taken into account.  
Other health concerns 
It should also be recalled that Saskatoon’s first bylaws limiting the keeping of animals 
were on the basis of health and safety. That being said, those bylaws did not regulate poultry. 
Furthermore, they regulated animals in the city, as opposed to prohibiting them as the current 
bylaws do. 
In a recent article published by the StarPhoenix, a veterinarian from the University of 
Saskatchewan suggests that he knows of one case where an illness in a child might have been 
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caused by maintaining close contact with chickens.
323
  A professor in animal health and poultry 
science also commented in the article that we should not be fearful of having chickens in the 
city.
324
 
The article was posted following a debate in city council, where a city counselor posited 
that someone could die from a food borne illness from eggs from backyard chickens, or that a 
child could die from playing in manure.
325
 Interestingly, the veterinarian was not quoted for 
raising any concerns of the same risks occurring in relation to cats or dogs. Presumably, he was 
satisfied by the safety measures built into the Animal Control Bylaw and people’s general best 
practices. At the moment, the Animal Control Bylaw restricts residents from allowing animal 
feces to accumulate on the property as to create a health hazard.
326
 On point, another city 
counselor asked for specific examples of when people have died or become ill from backyard 
chickens as he had never heard any negative feedback from anyone living beside people with 
chickens.
327
 
Many of those cautious of urban agriculture suggest that it may be unsafe for toxicological 
reasons.
328
 This is not surprising because most research into the risk of toxins presented by 
farming urban sites is focused on the risks posed by farming on marginalized and vacant lots, 
such as brownfields or abandoned industrial lots.
329
 These would undoubtedly be some of the 
riskiest sites to garden in a city.  
                                                 
323
 Betty Ann Adam – Chickens can be deadly, supra note 294. 
324
 Ibid.  
325
 Ibid.  
326
 Animal Control Bylaw, supra note 26 at s 14(1).  
327
  Betty Ann Adam – Chickens can be deadly, supra note 294. 
328
  Matthew Bradshaw, “The Rise Of Urban Agriculture: A Cautionary Tale--No Rules, Big 
Problems” William & Mary Business Law Review 4.1 (2013). 
329
 Nathan McClintock, “Assessing soil lead contamination at multiple scales in Oakland, 
 71 
Surely, good regulation is based on good empirical information. It may be preferred to 
quantify the local risks before proceeding. This would give “prior justification” to the release of 
animal wastes as opposed to assuming that they are acceptable.
330
 Accordingly, it could serve 
municipalities that are hesitant to allow chickens into the city to implement pilot projects to 
identify and measure the seriousness of any potential health or nuisance risks. While this would 
require resources and could not be something imposed on council, it might be a good 
compromise between litigation and persisting with paternalistic bylaws.  
Saskatoon has denied a pilot project,
331
 mostly on risks of health and safety (which 
ironically the project would aim to measure), and the notion that “chickens belong in the 
country”. 
Again, there was no evidence led in R v Hughes to suggest that Mr. Hughes’ chickens 
posed a health and safety concern. Moreover, Mr. Hughes led evidence that urban chickens are 
safe, if kept in small numbers and with consideration to sanitation.  
Nuisance and Backyard Chickens 
“Nuisance” is a legal term that can attract slightly different legal definitions depending on 
the context, and very different legal applications, even in the same context given that it often 
calls a trier of fact to make a determination of reasonableness. Nuisance is a term that is given a 
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definition by almost every municipality. For example, the City of Saskatoon’s The Property 
Maintenance & Nuisance Abatement Bylaw, 2003
332
 defines a nuisance as including property or 
things that, “(a) affect the safety, health and welfare of people in the neighbourhood; or (b) affect 
the amenity of a neighbourhood.”333 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Tock v St. John's Metropolitan Area Board
334
  provided 
the following definition and exploration of the term in the context of nuisance as an actionable 
tort: 
… the very existence of organised society depended on a generous application of the 
principle of "give and take, live and let live".  It was therefore appropriate to interpret as 
actionable nuisances only those inconveniences that materially interfere with ordinary 
comfort as defined according to the standards held by those of plain and sober tastes.  In 
effect, the law would only intervene to shield persons from interferences to their 
enjoyment of property that were unreasonable in the light of all the circumstances.
335
 
What is often consistent between the common law and statutory definition of nuisance is 
that both will require a determination of the standard of unreasonableness and whether the act, 
omission, property, or thing in question exceeded the standard.  
Skene J. notes in Hughes that the sky has not fallen on other cities that changed their 
bylaws to permissively regulate chickens.
336
 Mr. Hughes safely composted his hens’ waste, 
which was then used to fertilize his vegetable production, which is suggested to have reached 
yields as high as 260 pounds in one season.
337
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Similarly, chickens are not deemed to be a nuisance in Saskatoon pursuant to the Animal 
Control Bylaw.
338
 The bylaw read as a whole regulates nuisances related to other animals, such 
as cats, dogs, and pigeons.
339
  The question then becomes whether chickens are implicitly 
characterized as a nuisance, and whether it is reasonable to do so.  
The American Planning Association in their Zoning Practice bulletin suggest that the 
keeping of urban chickens rarely causes a nuisance.
340
 The potential for chicken related 
nuisances is mitigated if roosters are absent, there are limited numbers of hens, and slaughtering 
is not permitted within the city.
341
  
Perhaps one of the greatest hurdles to convincing people that backyard hens are not a 
nuisance would be to disentangle the way that decision-makers associate larger livestock 
operations and backyard micro-livestocking. The World Health Organization provides three 
distinct groupments of urban livestock: (1) subsistence backyard (or personal use); (2) semi-
commercial (including community gardens); and (3) large-scale commercial systems.
342
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Unsurprisingly, larger scale commercial systems are suggested to be “the most problematic 
because they produce large amounts of waste such as excrement and urine.”343 
While it is not within the scope of this paper to fully survey and weigh the empirical data 
relating to whether backyard chickens could constitute a nuisance, the following section takes a 
limited view of how the nuisance related risks such as noise, odour and attraction of pests and 
predators may routinely be overstated.  
Noise 
British Columbia’s Ministry of Agriculture reports that the noise level within a layer 
breeder house is at about 66dB when roosters are not crowing.
344
 This is similar to the noise level 
of an office.
345
 Accordingly, the noise level of a hen laying an egg is about the same as or less 
than a person talking. A hen laying an egg would be at its loudest. A dog bark is louder than a 
person talking, and can be louder than a person shouting.
346
  
Odour 
Feces smell, chickens do not. In rejecting a presentation to city counsel to revamp the 
Animal Control Bylaw, one city counselor noted that he grew up on a farm with over one to three 
hundred chickens – and they stunk.347 It is undoubted that one to three hundred chickens living in 
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close courters would stink, especially if the waste is not dealt with on a routine basis. It is 
undoubted that the keeping of any animal in numbers of one to three hundred would result in 
odour. However, this information does not apply to the keeping of a few free ranging hens, cats, 
or dogs in a backyard.    
John Wolforth, Planning and Zoning Director in Jefferson County, Colorado has this to say 
about minimizing the risk of odours from back yard chickens:  
Chickens themselves do not smell. Any possible odor would be from feces, but five small 
hens generate less manure than one medium-sized dog. The manure is not likely to 
accumulate because it’s a source of free fertilizer for the garden. Once tilled into the soil, 
manure no longer causes objectionable odors. Dog and cat feces cannot be used as 
fertilizer or composted because they contain pathogens that can infect humans. Therefore, 
dog and cat waste is more likely to accumulate and smell.
348
 
Referring back to the World Health Organizations groupments of urban chicken keeping, it 
must be kept in mind that not all henhouses are the same. There were no findings in this research 
project of instances where the keeping of nominal number of chickens in a coop that was 
regularly cleaned resulted in odour to neighbours greater than background environmental smells.  
Pests and predators  
Some fear that chickens attract pests. Chicken excrement might increase local bioactivity, 
which could produce environments conducive to pests. At the same time, it is noted that chickens 
eat ticks, slugs, and mice.
349
 The compostibility of chicken waste, especially relative to other 
animals such as cats and dogs, minimizes this potential for attracting pests. Bridgid McCrea, a 
PhD who specializes in poultry extension, suggests that backyard bird feeders and waterers are 
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the greatest potential for an increase in pest activity associated with backyard chickens.
350
 Given 
that many house cats, if well fed, will stop hunting for pests, it appears that the notion of 
chickens attracting pests is less logically related to empirical evidence than the notion that cats or 
dogs attract pests.  
Cities are filled with garbage bins, cats, wild birds and rabbits, and other scents that might 
attract predators, such as coyotes. Cities are also filled with people, cars and other disincentives 
for predators, and it would appear that the latter is the determining factor in the relative absence 
of predators in urban environments.  What is known is that predators are more prevalent in rural 
areas in comparison to urban areas.
351
 No sources were available to suggest that a backyard 
chicken will attract pests or predators into cities, and it is outside the scope of this initiate a study 
on this issue.  
That chickens are associated with the presence of predators could have more to do with the 
fact that chickens are relatively defenseless, and accordingly, there is more evidence when a 
predator does visit a coop relative to when a predator visits a backyard with a nimble cat. 
However, some suggest that this alone does not mean that chickens attract predators into the 
space anymore than other rabbits, birds, or small pets would.  
From an owner’s perspective, chickens can be protected by ensuring that coops are well 
built, and that chickens are housed in their coop overnight.   
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Summary 
The indicia of nuisance explored in this chapter – noise, odour and attraction of pests – 
suggest that the keeping of cats and dogs poses a greater risk to nuisance than does the keeping 
of a few chickens. A complete prohibition on urban hens appears to be empirically arbitrary 
when attempts are made to anchor the prohibition in relation with the municipal authority to 
regulate nuisance. It makes little sense then to prohibit an animal unless it is a nuisance animal, 
or unless there are health and safety issues associated with the animal. This is not to say that 
chickens should not be regulated. Rather, the conclusion drawn here is that a small number of 
hens cannot credibly be said to pose a nuisance risk in consideration of the existing animals that 
are permitted to be kept in backyards.   
4.4 Nexus to the regulation of animals  
It is difficult to imagine a situation where a city or municipality would be able to articulate 
a reason for passing an animal related bylaw that was not also in relation to either health and 
safety or nuisance. As noted in the introductory chapter, the earliest regulations concerning 
animals in Saskatoon were under the banner of health and safety, and they also addressed 
nuisance concerns.  
One of the few cases turning on the heading of “wild and domestic animals and activities 
in relation to them” is Churchill (Town) v Ladoon352 from the Manitoba Provincial Court, where 
the court highlighted that the bylaw was passed in relation to nuisance and health and safety 
concerns: 
[9]        The by-law passed in 2005 replaced an earlier existing by-law which did not 
address rottweiler and pit-bull breeds that were becoming a safety issue for the town. The 
new by-law also addressed two other issues which were absent in the old by-law; kennels 
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and dog teams.  The new by-law was developed in response to concerns expressed by 
community members over the increased number of dog teams being kept by residents.  
With the large number of dogs in one area, residents began to complain about the noise 
(from barking and howling) and the bad smell generated as a result of owners failing to 
keep the area clean.
353
 
There was no case law found on the constitutionality of the authority to regulate “wild and 
domestic animals and activities in relation to them”. This authority largely goes unquestioned.354 
This could be because most animal control bylaws are invariably focused on the prevention of 
nuisances or health safety issues, which is a superfluous and welcomed power for municipalities 
to have.  
As discussed above in relation to the Xentel case,
355
 which resulted in the quashing of the 
anti-circus bylaw, when animal control bylaws are not focused on a real issue pertaining to 
health and safety, nuisance or the regulation of animals, they may very well exceed municipal 
jurisdiction.
356
  
The power to prohibit chickens could be undertaken pursuant to the power to regulate 
animals, although, the purpose of doing so would be difficult to articulate absent health, safety or 
nuisance concerns, much in the same way that it would be difficult to articulate a reason for 
prohibiting pets.  
4.5 Evaluation of jurisdiction to ban hens pursuant to Saskatoon’s Zoning Bylaw 
Zoning bylaws differ somewhat from other bylaws in that they are concerned largely with 
development standards and maintaining the amenity of a neighbourhood as to encourage 
environmental, cultural and economic prosperity. Marianna Valverde suggests that zoning and 
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standards are the two key instruments of municipal sovereignty over private property.
357
 At some 
point, she argues, we should question our agreeableness to municipalities having so much power 
over private interests.
358
 
Saskatoon’s first zoning bylaw was passed in the 1930s.359 The bylaw defined zones, lot 
sizes, and permissible allowances for structures and roads. The zoning bylaw, in many respects, 
codified the gridiron design of the city. Gridiron, which is characterized by a series of parallel 
streets placed perpendicular to a series of perpendicular avenues, maximization of lot frontages 
and transportation infrastructure. This way of planning towns and cities was common in the 
prairies during the era of railway engineers doubling as city planners.
360
 The gridiron design is 
contrasted with the radio centric design of common to medieval cities, which some argue, has 
social consequences:  
Max Weber praised medieval cities because people could easily identify with the city as 
their social world. Today’s tall gridiron cities work against such positive identification – 
preoccupied with ‘how much is it worth (the street, the house, the job)… other human 
concerns – maintaining the old neighborhood, religious ties and an identification of the 
city as a whole – have fallen by the wayside.361 
 In the view of sociologists Artibise and Stetler, zoning bylaws demonstrated the 
emergence of “the narrow view of beauty as orderliness”, which “quite ignored that central 
criterion of city beautiful thinkers: the avoidance of visual monotony.”362  
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Zoning plans were prolific during this era and they were brought forward from local 
councils – not from the state level – as state level planning in this regard would have been 
perceived as “bad” or “socialist”.363 Accordingly, they were defended as descriptive rather than 
prescriptive.
364
 Zoning was defended as an exercise of land classification and the question of the 
manipulation of property rights were not presented during the discourse.
365
 This may be because 
initial zoning bylaws, as suggested by Valverde, were implemented to further the economic goals 
of middle-class families and business leaders “who dominated (and still dominate) municipal 
politics”.366 As cited above, Valverde suggests that, “urban aesthetic regulation does not only 
empower certain groups of persons. It also ranks activities and spaces along a kind of moral 
“chain of being””.367 
As noted in the introduction, section 5.23 of the Zoning bylaw prohibits the keeping of 
livestock in all districts within the city,
368
 with the exception of livestock confined to agricultural 
districts, future urban development districts, pound keepers, the SPCA, veterinary clinics, 
hatcheries or other specially approved locations and circumstances.
369
 These exceptions 
effectively exclude the keeping of chickens in backyards. The Zoning Bylaw defines livestock as 
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“cattle, sheep, swine, goats, llamas, horses, chickens, turkeys, water fowl and similar 
animals.”370 
The following section argues that it is outside the scope of Saskatoon’s jurisdiction to 
prohibit livestock using its zoning power.  
Land Use and Zoning in Saskatchewan 
The Planning and Development Act, 2007
371
 provides that the purpose of zoning is “to 
control the use of land for providing for the amenity of the area within the council's jurisdiction 
and for the health, safety, and general welfare of the inhabitants of the municipality.”372  Notably 
this does not include a power to regulate nuisances directly. The majority of the Supreme Court 
in Québec Inc., held that zoning powers should not be used to define nuisances:  
Recourse to the power to define is helpful because it simplifies the task of those who 
must apply a by-law.  Thus, when an activity is defined as a nuisance, a citizen, a 
municipal officer or a judge, as the case may be, knows exactly what obligations are 
imposed by the municipal by-law.  The standard is clear.  However, this does not mean 
that the power to define is unlimited.  For example, a municipality may not use its power 
to define a nuisance in place of its zoning power, thereby indirectly prohibiting an 
activity that would otherwise be authorized
373
 
Zoning bylaws control development standards (e.g. building heights and setbacks), and the 
location and separation of land uses.
374
 The Planning and Development Act, 2007 gives 
municipalities the power to define “a permitted use, a discretionary use, or a prohibited use in a 
district according to the intensity of use.”375  
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While provinces have administrative and supervisory powers to regulate land use,
376
 
municipalities undertake the breadth of zoning decisions and regulation. This is because 
municipalities are those most closely impacted by the long-term and often irreversible 
consequences that zoning decisions have on both the environment and private property rights.  
Community Plan’s aspiration for sustainability inconsistent with Zoning Bylaw prohibition 
In Saskatchewan, “any part of a zoning bylaw that is inconsistent with the official 
community plan has no effect insofar as it is inconsistent.”377 However, community plans 
themselves are interpreted with a high degree of deference to municipalities. The courts refer to 
community plans as “mere guidelines and policies rather than rules”.378 There is case law to 
support courts showing “deference to the decisions of municipalities and authorities such as the 
Director of Community Planning even if it disagrees with its policy or factual findings.”379 While 
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a municipal council’s perspective on what is consistent with a community plan is given 
deference by the courts,
380
 a bylaw can still be struck down if it shows a clear contradiction with 
a community plan.
381
  
Section 1.2 of Saskatoon’s Zoning Bylaw No 8770382 provides that the purpose of the 
Bylaw is “to regulate development in the City of Saskatoon to provide for the amenity of the area 
and for the health, safety, and general welfare of the inhabitants of the municipality in 
accordance with the provisions of the Official Community Plan.” 383 Following s.1.2, The Official 
Community Plan serves as a source of authority for Saskatoon’s Zoning Bylaw,384 as well as an 
interpretive aid.  
The Official Community Plan is enacted to ensure that the development of Saskatoon 
“takes place in an orderly and rational manner, balancing the environmental, social, and 
economic needs of the community”385 The act provides the “fundamental values” that will guide 
Saskatoon as it grows to a city of 500,000. “Saskatoon as a Sustainable City” is the first 
fundamental value listed by the Plan, which is further described in the Plan as follows:  
A sustainable community is one that meets its needs today without limiting the ability of 
future generations to meet their needs. This means a community that sustains its quality 
of life and accommodates growth and change by balancing long term economic, 
environmental and social needs. This Plan recognizes the following principles in building 
a community with a sustainable quality of life: 
a) economic diversity, economic security, and fiscal responsibility; 
b) environmental protection and stewardship; 
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c) equity in land use decisions and a fair distribution of community services; 
d) efficient use of land, infrastructure and other resources in managing the City and 
accommodating growth and change; 
e) decision making based on democratic institutions and public consultation; and 
f) community safety through the application of the principles of Crime Prevention 
Through Environmental Design (CPTED) …386 
To the extent that urban agriculture relates to Saskatoon being a sustainable community, 
the official community plan might be interpreted as supporting urban agriculture. The need to 
meet the needs of future generations, environmental stewardship and balancing long term 
economic, environmental and social needs would, on face, lend to support of locally and 
sustainably produced food. Drawing on Valverde, the environmentally slanted interpretation is 
unlikely, given that the implementation and interpretation of zoning bylaws typically favours 
convention, normalcy and control.
387
  
Notwithstanding the above, the high threshold required in proving that a bylaw is 
inconsistent with the community is likely not met in the case of the urban hen prohibition. The 
above argument, however, could buttress other claims that rely on determinations of 
reasonableness. Insofar as the Community Plan supports urban agriculture, urban agriculture 
should be interpreted as reasonable.  
The de minimums impact of a chicken on the amenity of a neighborhood 
A zoning bylaw banning cats (or hens) would likely need to relate to the omnibus zoning 
grant to regulate land in concern for “the amenity of the area” and “for the health, safety, and 
general welfare of the inhabitants of the municipality”388 as opposed to a specific grant.  Issues 
pertaining to health and safety were addressed in relation to Saskatoon’s Animal Control Bylaw 
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and do not need to be recited as they apply equally to zoning with regard to unreasonableness 
and moral reasoning. Accordingly, this section is focused on if and to what degree an urban hen 
would affect the amenity of a neighborhood.  
Mariana Valverde characterizes the regulation of amenity as the regulation of taste and 
culture:  
[Municipalities] regulate taste not only by banning certain sights and sounds and smells 
but also – in contrast to John Stuart Mill’s theory of law – by using law to compel people 
to maintain aesthetic standards, not only in public spaces but even in their own private 
property. Aesthetic standards are obviously culturally specific (and to some extent also 
generation- and gender-specific)…389  
Following Valverde’s normative portrayal of amenity, a city would be hard pressed to 
justify a ban on cats or dogs pursuant to its limited zoning power, largely because we accept dogs 
and cats. However, they should also be hard pressed to ban hens because zoning powers are 
limited; the inability to prohibit dogs and cats from cities should lead to the same conclusion for 
urban hens.  
Amenity is not defined in Saskatoon’s Zoning Bylaw. In Karagic v Calgary (City),390 the 
Alberta Court of Appeal found that the use of a boulevard relates to amenity. The Court therein 
acquiesced to the Wikipedia definition of amenity: “tangible or intangible benefits of a property, 
especially those that increase its attractiveness or value, or that contribute to its comfort or 
convenience.” 391 Again, as with many of the concepts and definitions reviewed throughout this 
work, amenity is a concept that occurs on a continuum and ultimately requires a determination of 
reasonableness. This definition of amenity is also subjective and therefore limited on its own to 
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assist in determining of the type of activity or scope of physical attributes of that could fall 
within the scope of amenities lawfully subject to the zoning power.  
The most obvious way that the Zoning Bylaw regulates the amenity of a neighborhood is 
through the regulation of the permanent and physical features of neighborhood. Examples 
include: set backs, building heights and the like.
392
 These standards will affect the amenity of a 
neighbourhood for decades if not centuries.
393
 The Zoning Bylaw also regulates landscaping of 
more permanent fixtures, such as hospitals, schools, civic centers, and businesses.
394
  
The provisions in the Zoning Bylaw banning livestock from non-agricultural portions of the 
city have merit when applied in certain contexts. The amenity of downtown Saskatoon would 
certainly be impacted by introducing intensive livestock densities. The separation of intensive 
agricultural land uses from residential land uses is reasonable for the same reasons that industrial 
zones should not overlap with residential or commercial zones. What Mr. Hughes and others are 
proposing, however, is entirely distinct from this context and any attempts by council to compare 
the two should be corrected. As many urban hen owners would attest, one, two or three hens are 
not “intensive” or distinct in any way from another pet when it comes to the amenity of the 
neighbourhood.  
Where Saskatoon’s impugned zoning provisions come into conflict with the scope of their 
zoning powers is that a single (or two, or three) hen(s) in each back yard does not affect the 
amenity of a neighbourhood beyond di minimus. The current acceptability of dogs, cats, pigeons 
and the like provide a pet presence that would mask any effects that a hen would have in a 
neighbourhood.  
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Returning for a moment to the introductory chapter of this work, I recall what it was like 
keeping several hens in my backyard. They were quiet and I am unsure if all of my neighbours 
knew they were there. In contrast, one of my neighbours kept two dogs that exceeded 80 lbs and 
would bark frequently. You could not miss them. While I am unsure of the appropriateness of 
keeping large dogs in the city, insofar as they are there, their presence will certainly minimize 
any effect that a few hens would have in connection with the amenity of a neighbourhood.  
4.6 Other prohibitive considerations 
Restrictive covenants 
Some local lawyers who have practiced in real estate law for some years suggest that 
decades old restrictive covenants exist in Saskatoon that prohibit the keeping of urban hens. 
None of the lawyers could remember the description of the specific land titles burdened with the 
covenants, and therefore, their existence could not be confirmed.  
In Everyday Law on the Streets, Valverde discusses how gated communities have “more 
exorbitant aesthetic rules.”395 She questions to what extent these communities “should be 
allowed to impose all manner of culturally specific rules on their members.”396 In so doing, she is 
questioning the scope and reach of property related restrictive covenants.  
Restrictive covenants are contracts that run with the land.
397
 They most often take form of 
limiting land use and aesthetics of buildings, for example, the colour of shingles, or in relation to 
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this case, the restriction of hens.
398
 A restrictive covenant stipulates an easement-like restriction 
on the property rights of a subservient party for the benefit of the dominant tenement.
399
  
Restrictive covenants can pass from the original contractors to their respective assignees.
400
 
Covenants can be challenged on the basis that i) the neighbourhood has changed to the extent 
that the covenant is no longer relevant, ii) the covenant is spent or unworkable, or iii) its 
enforcement would be vexatious.
401
  
There are many examples of legislatures overriding restrictive covenants in relation to real 
property in order to protect other interests deemed to be more important. For example, the 
Residential Tenancies Act, 2006
402
 overrides any contractual clause that restricts the rights of a 
tenant contrary to the Act.
403
 As indicated by Valverde, another example is the Nova Scotia’s 
Clothesline Act,
404
 which provides that: “No Act, by-law, covenant, agreement or contract 
prevents or prohibits the installation, placement or use of a clothesline outdoors at a single family 
dwelling or on the ground floor of a multi-unit residential building.”405 
While there may be many examples of legislation used to override restrictive covenants 
that pertain to real property, it is less evident whether the Charter or fundamental principles of 
municipal law could be used given that the covenants arise from contract and property law. At 
this point in my analysis, save legislative action, it is difficult to discern how these might be 
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challenged. Perhaps the only way would be to suggest that the nature and quality of the 
neighbourhood, or perhaps society, has changed in such a way that the covenant is no longer 
relevant.  
The Precautionary Principle 
The precautionary principle is often associated with Spraytech,
406
 supra, where the 
Supreme Court of Canada was tasked with determining whether a bylaw limiting the use of 
pesticides was ultra vires the jurisdiction of the municipality. At paragraph 31, the Court defined 
the precautionary principle as follows: 
In order to achieve sustainable development, policies must be based on the precautionary 
principle. Environmental measures must anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of 
environmental degradation. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, 
lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.
407
 
The bylaw in issue allowed organic pesticides to be used in instances where the purpose of 
the pesticide application was residential and aesthetic. The bylaw did not allow conventional 
pesticides to be used in the same context. No evidence was led to confirm or deny that the use of 
conventional pesticides posed a health risk to human.
408
 It was sufficient that the bylaw be 
upheld as a preventative and precautionary measure to preventing environmental degradation.
409
   
The impugned bylaw was found to be within the jurisdiction of the municipality, in part, 
because the bylaw was regulatory as opposed to prohibitory in nature. At paragraph 55, Lebel J. 
in his concurring opinion states that it is a longstanding principle of municipal law that “a by-law 
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may not be prohibitory and may not discriminate unless the enabling legislation so 
authorizes.”410  
It is unlikely that the precautionary principle could be used to prevent the keeping of 
chickens in urban environments.  As already discussed, arguments are often made that livestock 
waste will attract pests and are vectors for disease, and create nuisances by way of odor and 
noise. While all of the above are theoretically possible, there is little empirical evidence to prove 
they pose a significant risk. It must be kept in mind that the precautionary principle applies 
“where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage”.411 I have found no evidence to 
suggest that I have found to suggest that keeping a few chickens poses a threat of serious or 
irreversible environmental damage.  
Rather than a shield for the City, the precautionary principle may act as a sword for the 
claimant. Keeping a few chickens likely improves the local biodiversity by improving soil 
quality. Furthermore, with respect to environmental externalities, keeping urban livestock has the 
advantage of creating a waste stream that can be used for vegetable production as opposed to 
importing such resources; it reduces the prevalence of intensive livestock operations and their 
associated environmental harms; and, it reduces the ‘food-miles’ required for eating protein 
intensive foods. These outcomes of keeping chickens all point towards mitigating the serious and 
irreversible damage likely to be caused by climate change. Accordingly, the precautionary 
principle may work more in favour of keeping chickens than against it. From a broad 
perspective, it is doubtful that the perceived and actual risks and nuisances presented by urban 
agriculture outweigh the potential benefits, such as: increased food security, decrease in food 
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deserts, decreased obesity, reduction of food miles and climate change impacts, increased 
biodiversity through a reduced dependence on monocultures, decreased eutrophication, and 
improved animal welfare.
412
  
Summary of Municipal Jurisdiction 
Based on the relatively weak empirical evidence of nuisance, and the arguably de minimus 
impact that keeping chickens would have on the amenity of a neighbourhood, it is unsurprising 
that the judge in Smedley, noted at the outset of this work, determined the following with regard 
to Mr. Smedley’s chicken keeping: 
In summary, the chickens kept by this family are pets. They are in virtually every way 
inoffensive. There is no evidence that they are now creating excessive or even noticeable 
noise. There is no offensive odour. The way in which they are kept is not unsightly. The 
chickens remain on their own property seemingly doing no harm to either the aesthetic 
qualities of the neighbourhood nor to the quiet enjoyment of the property of the 
immediate neighbours. As compared to some other activities that might be legally 
undertaken on a residential property, the keeping of these pet chickens seems relatively 
benign. No allegation has been made and no evidence has been adduced to suggest that 
these chickens attract vermin.
413
 
While this was but one judge’s observations in relation to one family’s keeping of 
chickens, it was similarly determined in Hughes that his chickens were not reported as a 
nuisance, nor was there any evidence led in that regard.  
Without any credible evidence of the purpose of the prohibition relating to a valid 
municipal purpose, it is argued that the prohibition is arbitrary, and the City’s reasoning for 
upholding the prohibition is respectfully argued as lacking candour. All of the above is 
suggestive of moral, and therefore unjustifiable, reasoning. However, municipalities are given 
great deference in undertaking their duties. Deference to municipalities would be the greatest 
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hurdle to succeeding on an ultra vires claim, although, the lack of defensibility of the prohibition 
would assist in tipping the scales in favour of a claimant who established a Charter violation, as 
discussed in the following Chapter.  
  
 93 
CHAPTER 5 -  THE CHARTER’S PROTECTION OF URBAN MICRO-
LIVESTOCKING 
5.1 The Charter of Rights and its Fundamental Freedoms 
Overview 
The issue at stake in this work is broader than the liberty to eat locally produced free range 
eggs, but rather a claimant’s power to self-provision, to survive,  and to choose how he or she 
engages with life-supporting systems, such as the climate and personal food production. In this 
way, this section draws on food sovereignty’s prioritization of producers’ interests in food 
systems, which is captured in the Declaration of Nyéléni, which is quoted above in section 3.2  
and repeated for ease of reference: 
Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food 
produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define 
their own food and agriculture systems. It puts those who produce, distribute and 
consume food at the heart of food systems and policies rather than the demands of 
markets and corporations
414
 
 In the context of urban hen prohibitions, protection of conscience and expression may 
arise because of a deeply held environmentally based belief that obliges someone to act or forgo 
acting in a certain way. This obligation may arise in a claimant’s position in relation to the global 
food system and its perceived (or actual) environmental and socially unjust consequences, which 
is exemplified by the food sovereignty framework.  
This Chapter considers two fundamental freedoms to Canadian democracy, namely the 
freedom of expression and the freedom of conscience and religion, and how these freedoms 
might be used to challenge urban hen prohibitions. As a starting point, the following section 
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considers how courts balance legislative programs with fundamental freedoms and some of the 
general mechanics of raising a Charter claim.  
The Mechanics of Claiming a Fundamental Charter Right or Freedom 
Distinctively Canadian, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
415
 provides protections to 
“phases of Canadian life which should normally be beyond the reach of any majority, save by 
constitutional amendment.”416  In Canadian jurisprudence, the primary role of policy 
development belongs to Parliament.
417
 Habitual deference to the legislature on economic and 
social policy decisions is warranted based on the resources and training available to lawmakers 
to choose between competing interests.
418
 Similarly, the doctrine of subsidiarity provides that 
democratically elected municipal decision-makers have a closer view of local governance issues, 
and therefore should be afforded greater deference in dealing with them.
419
 Notwithstanding 
legislative deference, the fundamental role of the courts is to remind government from time to 
time of the limitations to which state activities are subject.
420
  
Charter analyses first ask whether either the purpose or the effect of the government 
activity or legislation in issue infringes the right or freedom being analysed. Dickson C.J. 
provides that “Canadian courts must deny effect to any federal or provincial statute that offends 
the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter.”421 In proving a violation, it is not enough for 
a person to say that his or her rights have been infringed; the claimant must provide objective 
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proof of interference on a balance of probabilities.
422
 In the context of this work, applicants 
would need to meet an evidentiary burden to explain how the keeping of backyard hens in urban 
environments infringes a fundamental right or freedom.  
When Charter rights are interpreted as giving a broad scope, it is easier for claimants to 
establish that a government action infringes them, and the focus naturally turns to the 
government to justify legislation that infringes the rights. Accordingly, where rights (such as the 
freedom of expression) are given a broad scope, the Canadian legal system steps closer to the 
justification theory discussed above by Sonu Bedi,
423
 which requires the state to provide reasons 
when justifying infringements of liberty. This should be kept in mind when reading the decision 
of Skene J. in Hughes who interprets Mr. Hughes’ rights narrowly.  
Fundamental Freedoms  
Section 2 of the Charter provides: 
Fundamental freedoms 
 
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: 
(a) freedom of conscience and religion; 
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and 
other media of communication; 
(c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and 
(d) freedom of association. 
                                                 
422
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Fundamental freedoms are not absolute.
424
 They are limited by Section 1 of the Charter to 
“such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.”425 If a provision or government action is found to infringe a protected right 
or freedom, then the analysis proceeds to determine whether the infringement is justified as a 
reasonable limitation.
426
  
5.2 The Charter’s Section 2(b) Freedom of Expression 
Geographer and legal commentator Nicholas Blomely provides a provocative yet astute 
narrative of the intrinsically expressive and deeply personal quality of land use.  
The [Pollan’s] front lawn symbolized the collective face of suburbia, the backyard its 
private aspect. In the back, you could do pretty much whatever you wanted, but out in 
front you had to take account of the community's wishes and its self-image. Fences and 
hedges were out of the question: they were considered antisocial, unmistakable symbols 
of alienation from the group.  
…  
[Pollan] celebrates his father's refusal to mow his lawn as a "clear message to our 
neighbors". As his father "owned the land, he could do whatever he wanted to do with it". 
Before long, the "grasses grew tall enough to flower and set seed; the lawn rippled in the 
breeze like a flag. There was beauty here, I'm sure, but it was not visible in this context. 
Stuck in the middle of a row of tract houses on Long Island, the lawn said turpitude, 
rather than meadow.... It also said, to the neighbors, fyou.
427
 
While the message intended by Mr. Hughes hen keeping is vastly different from that of 
Pollan’s father, and is expressed in Mr. Hughes’ backyard as opposed to front, Mr. Hughes 
message is equally expressive and would be interpreted as equally controversial by many.  
                                                 
424
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In Hughes, Skene J. notes that Mr. Hughes characterized the trial as the “Canadian Right to 
Food Trial”.428 In his trial, Mr. Hughes argued that that his keeping of urban hens was expressive 
and therefore that Calgary’s RPO Bylaw violated Mr. Hughes’ Charter guarantee to freedom of 
expression. Skene J. rejected this argument, notwithstanding the broad scope of freedom of 
expression.
429
 This section argues that Hughes’ actions were expressive and that Skene J. should 
have proceeded to analyse whether the Bylaw was saved only by imposing a reasonable 
limitation on Hughes’ expressive action.  
The Legal Test for Freedom of Expression 
The freedom of speech and expression is firmly accepted “as a necessary feature of 
modern democracy.”430 Irwin Toy Ltd. v Québec (Attorney General),431 another landmark 
decision by Dickson C.J., developed the test for determining whether a government action 
violates a claimant’s guarantee to freedom of expression.432 A recent rehearsal of the Irwin Toy 
sets out three steps for analyzing section 2(b) claims.
 433
 
The first step asks whether the action in question was expressive, and is generally an easy 
threshold to pass. The second step asks if “the method or location of this expression remove that 
protection”.434 Violent expression, for example, is not protected by s. 2(b) because it undermines 
the values that the Charter seeks to protect. Upon determining that the expression is protected, 
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the third step of the analysis considers whether the government act limits expression, either 
directly or indirectly, in a manner that is more than trivial or insubstantial.
435
 If the government’s 
purpose was not to limit expression, but does so in effect, the claimant then needs to establish 
how their expression is related to the values that s. 2(b) seeks to protect.
436
 Such values include: 
(1) democratic discourse, (2) truth finding and (3) self-fulfillment.
437
 While this work does not 
consider whether food sovereignty might be a Charter principle itself, it argues below that a 
subjective desire to advance the goals of food sovereignty is aligned with Charter values.  
These steps are analysed below, in relation to the Hughes decision, concluding that Mr. 
Hughes was demonstrating a non-violent mode of self-provisioning and land-use predicated on 
his commitments to environmental sustainability and social justice.   
1. The Expressiveness of Keeping a Chicken 
Freedom of expression provides a broad scope of protection to expression, covering 
activities such as: advertising tobacco products, advertising to children, and adult 
pornography.
438
 It has unsurprisingly been noted that “[t]he constitutional guarantee extends not 
only to that which is pleasing, but also to that which to many may be aesthetically distasteful or 
morally offensive; it is indeed often true that ‘one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”439  
In R v Keegstra, the Supreme Court of Canada held that “all activities conveying or 
attempting to convey meaning are considered expression for the purposes of s. 2(b); the content 
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of expression is irrelevant in determining the scope of this Charter provision.”440 Accordingly, 
subject to some important limitations, such as violent expression, expressive content is 
presumptively protected under section 2(b).
441
 The contextual values and factors that will 
determine whether an infringement of a claimant’s freedom of expression is justified are saved 
for the section 1 analysis.
442
 
Dickson C.J. contemplated even day-to-day tasks, such as parking a car, as potentially 
having expressive content: “an unmarried person might, as part of a public protest, park in a zone 
reserved for spouses of government employees in order to express dissatisfaction or outrage at 
the chosen method of allocating a limited resource.”443 The breadth of activities covered by 
freedom of expression is also exemplified in the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in R v 
Banks,
 444
 which held that the act of begging is “evidently” expressive and that the activity of 
squeegeeing is essentially an act of begging.
445
 With squeegeeing, even though words are not 
spoken, the message conveyed is that of requesting assistance and invites participation of the 
community in providing assistance.  
In Banks, by broadly characterizing the communication in issue as begging rather than as 
something narrower in relation to squeegeeing, the impugned bylaw was easily classified as 
regulatory as opposed to prohibitive. The ban on squeegeeing was upheld by section 1 on the 
basis that the bylaw did not prohibit expressing the need for help.
446
 This reasoning follows the 
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courts’ tendency of upholding legislation that is characterized as regulatory as opposed to 
prohibitive.
447
  
In Bell v Toronto (City),
448
 the appellant, Sandra Bell, was successful in overturning a 
conviction under a municipal by-law that effectively prohibited naturalized gardens by way of 
prohibiting “excessive growths of weeds and grass”.449 She argued that the prohibition violated 
her freedom to express her environmental beliefs, which were manifested through her 
“environmentally sound wild garden”.450  Fairgrieve J. stated unequivocally that Ms. Bell’s 
practice was expressive:  
There can be no doubt that the appellant's act of growing a naturalistic garden that 
included tall grass and weeds had expressive content and conveyed meaning. As an 
environmentalist, Ms. Bell implemented a landscaping form intended to convey her 
sincerely held beliefs concerning the relationship between man and nature. It also 
implicitly conveyed a critique of the prevailing values reflected in conventional 
landscaping practices. She testified that she meant to show her son, and presumably the 
public at large, that one could coexist with nature in a peaceful, nurturing way. In Ross v 
School District No. 15, supra at p. 865, La Forest J. repeated that "the unpopularity of the 
views espoused" is not relevant to determining whether their expression falls within the 
guarantee of freedom of expression. The fact that many people evidently do not share the 
appellant's environmental beliefs and disapprove of the way she chose to manifest them 
does not remove her chosen form of expression from the protection of s. 2(b).
451
 
 In balancing the community’s purported interest in conventional uniformity with Ms. 
Bell’s interest in expressing her view of the relationship between people and nature, Fairgrieve J. 
had no hesitation in siding with Ms. Bell. Fairgrieve J. sees Ms. Bell’s activity as important, and 
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the views of the community as less reasonable. The nuisance-like analysis undertaken by 
Fairgrieve provides an example of where the Charter can override municipal wisdom.  
In what might be regarded as one of the more contentious parts of Skene J.’s judgment in 
Hughes, Skene J. suggests that Mr. Hughes’ practice was not expressive.452 With respect, this 
determination is difficult to reconcile with the broad scope of freedom of expression and the 
characteristics of Mr. Hughes’ practice.   
In Hughes, Skene J. acknowledged that Mr. Hughes submitted that his activity was 
undertaken to convey meaning to others. Hughes submitted that “the raising of urban hens is an 
expression of his ability to raise his own food and act as a role model for others in food 
production and sustainability.”453 Mr. Hughes submitted that he was “leading by example” 
thereby “showing others they too can participate in local food sustainability and healthy 
eating.”454 Skene J. acknowledged Hughes’ community activism goals were to “continue to 
encourage other Calgarians and Canadians to lead healthy food sustainability lives.” 455 He also 
noted that Hughes is the founder of the advocacy group CLUCK (Canadian Liberated Urban 
Chicken Klub)
456
 and that he tries to live as sustainably as possible, which results in his efforts to 
produce as much food as possible from his urban plot.
457
 Further, Skene J. did not suggest that 
any of Mr. Hughes’ submissions were not credible. Nonetheless, Skene J. focused on a narrow 
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aspect of Mr. Hughes goal, which was “to produce eggs to feed himself and his family”458, in 
finding that it was not expressive.  
Skene J. held that Mr. Hughes’ practice was not expressive because it was not an activity 
of protest.
459
 Skene notes that an activity could have multiple purposes, leaving open the 
possibility that Mr. Hughes’ activity could have been undertaken for the purpose of feeding his 
family, and as a protest to an unjust bylaw or food system, but did not give any weight to the 
latter. In the end, Skene does not clearly articulate why Hughes’ activity is not expressive, but 
rather just says that it is not. Furthermore, Skene J.’s conclusion appears to ignore Mr. Hughes’s 
submissions on all of his other Charter claims that focused on the content of his actions.  
Skene J. arguably ignored that positive actions undertaken to “lead by example” are 
typically expressive because it is activity undertaken with a view of influencing others. In 
accepting Mr. Hughes’ submission that he was leading by example and therefore undertaking a 
form of expression and finding that he was not expressive, Skene J. could be setting a dangerous 
precedent of characterizing expressive self-actualizing as having meaningless or non-expressive 
content.   
Mr. Hughes’ involvement with CLUCK had the purpose of supporting urban chicken 
growers. In Mr. Hughes’ case, both promoting other urban hen owners, and his own urban hen 
growing, arguably have the same expressive content: resistance against “an unfair, illogical and 
unhealthy ban on a healthy activity”460 as Mr. Hughes suggested. Skene J.’s determination that 
hen-keeping was not expressive might have resulted from perceiving hen keeping as a semi-
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lucrative hobby, rather than Mr. Hughes’ manifestation of his commitment to achieving social 
and environmental goals through his urban land-use and community involvement. 
2. Does the method or location of this expression remove that protection? 
Internal limits to freedom of expression include a limit on the permitted method and 
location of expression.
 461
 The limitation of expression with regard to location is typically 
concerned with expression on public or state property, which can either limit or encourage 
expressive activity depending on the context.
462
  
If the expression in question occurs on private property there may be questions as to 
whether a state act has occurred as to engage Charter scrutiny.
 463
 In the private property context, 
the Charter will only be engaged if it is the government act or legislation that limits the 
claimant’s expression (as opposed to, say, the person who owns or operates the property in 
question).
464
 Sara Hamill suggests that, for better or worse, freedom of expression is privileged 
by those who own private property.
465
 
In Hughes, the internal limits on the method and location did not exclude keeping of urban 
hens. Rather, as the case law discussed below demonstrates, the private context of keeping urban 
hens assist in attracting Charter protection.   
An example of the protection of freedom of expression on private property was 
demonstrated in R v Guignard
466
 in relation to a bylaw banning signs in a residential area. The 
bylaw was struck down as constitutionally invalid for violating the accused’s freedom of speech. 
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Guignard’s sign portrayed Guignard’s dismay for an insurance company. The Court in Guignard 
characterized the sign put up by the defendant as “counter-advertising.” This type of advertising 
was suggested by the Court as having an important effect on the social and economic life of 
society: “The need for such expression derives from the very nature of our economic system, 
which is based on the existence of a free market.  The orderly operation of that market depends 
on businesses and consumers having access to abundant and diverse information.”467The Court 
reaffirmed the ruling in Ramsden
468
 of the importance of signs as an inexpensive, accessible and 
effective means of public communication, especially for those who do not have the resources to 
undertake media campaigns.
469
   
In Guignard, at paragraph 26, the Court implicitly supported economic and private 
property rights both as they related to freedom of expression:  
This infringement impacts especially on the freedom of expression of a person who does 
not have access to substantial financial resources.  A limitation of this nature can in fact 
deprive that person of the only means of expression that are truly accessible to him or her.  
Even when a legislative or regulatory provision is neutral in appearance, it can have a 
major impact on the ability of a person or group to engage in expressive activity (see 
Irwin Toy, at pp. 974-75).
470
 
On the facts of Hughes, Guignard is parallel in that both complainants used their private 
property as a location for expressing their viewpoints. Mr. Hughes noted his financial limitations 
and that part of the reason he was keeping hens was to feed his family. Mr. Hughes’ practice of 
                                                 
467
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keeping hens was also demonstrative; the private property context provided Mr. Hughes with a 
means of displaying his sustainability based practice that he would not have otherwise had the 
opportunity to do. Mr. Hughes demonstrative practice could be characterized as a form of 
“counter-advertising” by raising awareness of alternatives to the mainstream food system, which 
relate to its indicia of expressiveness.  
3. Purpose and effect 
The third step in the freedom of conscience analysis is concerned with determining 
whether the purpose or effect of the state act or legislation restricts the claimant’s freedom of 
expression. It was not obvious whether this was considered at all in Hughes.  
In Irwin Toy, Dickson C.J. held that if a state act was meant to “control attempts to convey 
a meaning either by directly restricting the content of expression or by restricting a form of 
expression tied to content, its purpose trenches upon the guarantee.” If the government’s purpose 
was genuinely not to restrict expression, the Court is to then consider whether the effect of the 
government act restricted expression. If the government acts unintentionally restricted 
expression, the plaintiff is required to “at least identify the meaning being conveyed and how it 
relates to the pursuit of truth, participation in the community, or individual self-fulfillment and 
human flourishing.
471
 According to Dickson C.J., the principles and values underlying the right 
are premised on the following observations: 
(1) seeking and attaining the truth is an inherently good activity; (2) participation in 
social and political decision-making is to be fostered and encouraged; and (3) the 
diversity in forms of individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing ought to be 
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cultivated in an essentially tolerant, indeed welcoming, environment not only for the sake 
of those who convey a meaning, but also for the sake of those to whom it is conveyed.
472
 
In Québec Inc., for example, the purpose of the exotic dancing related bylaw was found by 
the majority to be benign. However, the bylaw was found to infringe the claimant’s rights in 
effect. The court then considered the values underlying the expression, stating that, “engaging in 
lawful leisure activities promotes such values as individual self-fulfillment and human 
flourishing. The disputed value of particular expressions of self-fulfillment, like exotic dancing, 
does not negate this general proposition.”473 
In Bell v Toronto (City),
474
 supra Fairgrieve J. compared the importance of Ms. Bell’s 
expressive activity to other Charter protected activities, such as pole dancing, and concluded that 
Ms. Bell’s “activity cannot be dismissed as too trivial or insubstantial to warrant constitutional 
protection.”475 Fairgrieve suggests that “ the appellant's expressing her environmental beliefs, 
conveying a statement about living in harmony with nature, and seeking self-fulfillment in her 
gardening practices come much closer to the "core values" underlying s. 2(b) than the forms of 
expression given protection in those cases.”476 
Following Bell, Mr. Hughes would likely not have difficulty establishing that his activity 
falls closer to the core values underlying the Charter and s. 2(b) in comparison to other cases that 
that have received Charter protection. Mr. Hughes’ activity, given that it is demonstrative, is a 
form of community discourse on food systems and the relevant justice related issues. He 
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demonstrates a localized and more sustainable way of producing eggs that also addresses many 
of the animal welfare concerns associated with industrial practices.  
Section 1 Considerations  
The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Marriage Commissioners Appointed Under The Marriage 
Act (Re),
477
 succinctly outlines the two step test for analysing whether a Charter violation can be 
saved under section 1 of the Charter.  
[68]  The basic framework of analysis to be conducted in connection with s. 1 was set out 
by Dickson C.J.C. in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at pp. 138-39.  The first 
requirement is that the objective of the impugned law be of sufficient importance to 
warrant overriding a Charter right or freedom. The second requirement involves the 
satisfaction of a form of “proportionality” test.  Three factors are considered in 
determining if a law is proportional in this sense:  (a) the particulars of the law must be 
rationally connected to its objective, (b) the law must impair the right or freedom in 
question as minimally as possible, and (c) there must be an overall proportionality 
between the deleterious effects of the law and its object. 
In Bell, Fairgrieve J. found that the purpose of the bylaw was to “minimize aesthetic blight 
and avoid health and fire hazards and an environmental nuisance.” 478 This was found to be an 
objective that could be seen as sufficient to justify interference with Charter rights. Similarly, its 
prohibition of "excessive growths of weeds and grass" was determined to be rationally connected 
to these objectives.
479
  
Relying on Ramsden, supra, the bylaw in Bell was found to not have minimally impaired 
the claimant because the city could have achieved these objectives without prohibiting 
naturalized gardens:  
While the negation of a right or freedom does not necessarily require that such an 
infringement not be upheld under s. 1, the distinction between a limit that permits no 
exercise of a guaranteed right or freedom in a limited area of its potential exercise and 
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one that permits a qualified exercise of it may be relevant to the test of proportionality 
under s. 1. In Ford, the court held that a complete prohibition on the use of languages 
other than French on commercial signs could not meet the requirements of the 
proportionality test, particularly the rational connection and minimal impairment 
branches. …  It will therefore be more difficult to justify a complete ban on a form of 
expression than time, place or manner restrictions.
480
 
The Court held that while some of the goals of the bylaw were important enough to 
override a constitutional right, the appellant’s objective of “creating neat, conventionally 
pleasant residential yards” 481 did not warrant overriding “the right to express a differing view of 
man's relationship with nature.” 482 The Court anticipated that some are likely to find such 
gardens ugly and offensive, but nevertheless maintained, “some offence must be tolerated.”483 
Similarly, in the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench case, R v Morelli484 the Court held 
that there are no implied community standards with regard to the keeping of animals: 
The respondent also contends that the court should use common sense and in effect take 
notice that the keeping of a pet sheep is inconsistent with community standards in urban 
residential districts.  I agree that court decisions must make sense and be consistent with 
the objectives of the legislation, particularly where those objectives are broadly viewed 
by a community as establishing desirable standards to promote its general welfare.  But 
no evidence was adduced at trial as to what kinds of animals are considered by the 
community to be acceptable as pets in the city.  The term “domestic animals” is surely 
not restricted to dogs and cats. It likely covers a host of animals such as turtles, hamsters, 
caged birds, and possibly even more unusual pets such as pot bellied pigs.
485
 
On the facts of Hughes, the purpose of livestock prohibitions appears to be on similar 
grounds to Bell: nuisance, health and safety. Also, as with Bell, a complete prohibition of 
keeping livestock is unlikely required to meet these objectives. The regulation of animals, such 
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as cats and dogs, would be a suitable way of minimizing the risks of small livestock. Further, as 
indicated in Bell, to the extent that keeping chickens is socially unacceptable, the community is 
required to have a moderate level of tolerance of the unconventional. Following Morelli, we 
should be hesitant to ascribe conventionality in the absence of evidence. It should be kept in 
mind that U.S. largest cities permit keeping chickens, and Canada is arguably unconventional in 
its prohibitive tendencies.  
Summary 
In the three-step test for freedom of expression, finding that an activity attempts to convey 
meaning is an easy threshold to pass. Still, Skene J. found that Mr. Hughes’ activity was not 
expressive. Based on the discussion above, this is likely the strongest ground for appealing 
Hughes. Further, upon finding Mr. Hughes’ activity is expressive, a court would be hard pressed 
to articulate why the prohibition should be maintained under section 1. There are less intrusive 
ways of maintaining public welfare without prohibiting small livestock. Further, on the balance 
of interests, keeping chickens likely advances human flourishing more than the intolerance 
promoted by the prohibition.  
5.3 Developing a Test for Freedom of Conscience 
Introduction 
Section 2(a) of the Charter provides that “freedom of conscience and religion” is a 
fundamental freedom. The Supreme Court of Canada has yet to provide a comprehensive 
interpretation of the meaning and scope of “conscience” in the context of the freedom of 
conscience and religion. This interpretive gap provides some room to anticipate how a claim 
based on freedom of conscience might advance.  
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This section considers the principled works of Canadian constitutional scholars such as 
Richard Moon and others who discuss the possible boundaries to freedom of conscience.  In 
determining the merits of a claim for freedom of conscience, this section closely follows the 
well-established s. 2(a) counterpart, freedom of religion. One of Moon’s arguments is that 
freedom of religion and freedom of conscience are at the very least parallel rights. Based on this 
argument we can assume that the scope of freedom of religion could provide an initial 
framework for determining the scope of freedom of conscience.
486
 
This section argues that freedom of conscience, like freedom of religion and section 7 (life, 
liberty, and security of the person), would include the freedom to hold and manifest deeply held 
personal beliefs that relate to a conscientious framework. These factors are then applied to R v 
Hughes and the desire to live sustainably. This section concludes by suggesting that freedom of 
conscience could protect Mr. Hughes’ practice.   
Section 2(a)’s freedom to “hold and manifest” 
In R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,
487
 a case permitting a store to carry on business on a Sunday 
contrary to the Lord’s Day Act, and the first case to interpret section 2 of the Charter, Dickson 
C.J. explains that the values underlying our political and philosophic traditions “demand that 
every individual be free to hold and to manifest whatever beliefs and opinions his or her 
conscience dictates.”488 Dickson C.J. held that the freedom includes the freedom to act and the 
freedom from being compelled to act, stating that freedom “embraces both the absence of 
coercion and constraint, and the right to manifest beliefs and practices… no one is to be forced to 
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act in a way contrary to his beliefs or his conscience…”489 The ability to manifest and act (or not 
act) based on a belief gives substance to our fundamental freedoms. Without this quality, our 
section 2 would amount to a rather inconsequential protection of thought. 
Protection of subjectively held beliefs  
Freedom of religion protects subjectively held beliefs, as might freedom of conscience. In 
2004, the Supreme Court of Canada in Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem
490
 was split 5-4 on the 
scope of religious rights.
491
 The majority found that Mr. Amselem’s religious interest of setting 
up his own “succah” on the balcony of his condominium during the nine-day Jewish Succot 
holiday outweighed the interest of the respondent’s bylaw that precluded such activity.  
The dissent relied on expert evidence that the practice of setting up one’s own succah was 
not a religious requirement and that a communal succah, as preferred by the condominium 
authority, would have sufficed, and therefore, they opined that Mr. Amselem’s practice should 
not be afforded Charter protection.
492
 On the point of expert opinion, the majority was satisfied 
with Mr. Amselem’s subjective belief in the importance of the practice.493 The majority’s non-
requirement of an activity’s objective relation to a religion flowed from its definition of religion. 
The Court defined religion as:  
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 [F]reely and deeply held personal convictions or beliefs connected to an individual’s 
spiritual faith and integrally linked to one’s self-definition and spiritual fulfillment, the 
practices of which allow individuals to foster a connection with the divine or with the 
subject or object of that spiritual faith.
494
 
The Court’s definition of religion parallels what we think of as “conscience”. The Oxford 
Dictionary of English defines conscience as “a person's moral sense of right and wrong, viewed 
as acting as a guide to one's behavior.”495 The Manitoba Court of Appeal in Mackay v. 
Manitoba
496
 gave a similar definition. Both the definition of religion and conscience are 
concerned with guides to conduct. Consistent with Professor Hogg’s anticipated content of a 
freedom of conscience claim, the primary difference between conscience and religion appears to 
be that the source of religious conduct is religious in nature whereas the source of conscience is 
non-theological guides to conduct.  
The rationale for protecting subjectively obligated practices without expert approval 
In Amselem, the Supreme Court of Canada held that  “subjectively engendering a personal 
connection with the divine or with the subject or object of an individual’s spiritual faith 
irrespective of whether a particular practice or belief is required by official religious dogma or is 
in conformity with the position of religious officials.”497 The court discussed at paragraph 56-57 
why it was not necessary that the practice was obligatory or objectively held, holding that official 
religious positions often impose hierarchal determinations that can conflict with Charter values:  
Jewish women, for example, strictly speaking, do not have a biblically mandated 
“obligation” to dwell in a succah during the Succot holiday. If a woman, however, 
nonetheless sincerely believes that sitting and eating in a succah brings her closer to her 
Maker, is that somehow less deserving of recognition simply because she has no strict 
“obligation” to do so?  …  Should an individual Jew, who may personally deny the 
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modern relevance of literal biblical “obligation” or “commandment”, be precluded from 
making a freedom of religion argument despite the fact that for some reason he or she 
sincerely derives a closeness to his or her God by sitting in a succah?  Surely not.
498
 
Further, the court explicitly stated that expert opinion is not required in proving a religious 
obligation. The Court reasoned on this point that “Religious belief is intensely personal and can 
easily vary from one individual to another.  Requiring proof of the established practices of a 
religion to gauge the sincerity of belief diminishes the very freedom we seek to protect.”499 In 
excluding the need for expert evidence, the majority emphasizes that the protected right is the 
claimant’s personally affirmed religious practice.500 The test for freedom of religion appears to 
be moving towards protecting religious beliefs more on the basis that they are deeply and 
personally held, not because of any attachments to the importance of religious institutions.  
Conscience as an extension of (moral) liberty 
Moon argues that s. 2(a) has force to protect secular and non-religious practices “as a 
dimension of basic liberty of thought and action.”501 Like religion, liberty is an important aspect 
of life – not only as it relates to absence of state coercion – but also as it relates to the autonomy 
to make important life choices. Moon’s argument is premised on protecting the conscientious 
activity based on the merits and moral quality of the practice that is to be protected, not on how 
closely the impugned activity relates to a religious practice.  
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Wilson J.’s concurring judgment in R v Mortgentaler502 was one of the earlier decisions to 
consider the applicability of conscience under s. 2(a). Wilson J. interpreted s. 2(a) as providing 
equal protection to religious and non-religious yet moral and conscientious beliefs. In her view, 
the state should not enter into decisions that enforce “one conscientiously-held view at the 
expense of another” because to do so would:  “deny freedom of conscience to some, to treat them 
as means to an end, to deprive them, as Professor MacCormick puts it, of their "essential 
humanity".”503  
Wilson J.’s opinion in Morgentaler draws from the works of Professor Cyril E. M. Joad, 
who suggested that “the role of the state in a democracy is to establish the background conditions 
under which individual citizens may pursue the ethical values which in their view underlie the 
good life.”504 Throughout her analysis, she accentuates the liberty considerations underlying the 
Charter: 
I believe that the framers of the Constitution in guaranteeing "liberty" as a fundamental 
value in a free and democratic society had in mind the freedom of the individual to 
develop and realize his potential to the full, to plan his own life to suit his own character, 
to make his own choices for good or ill, to be non-conformist, idiosyncratic and even 
eccentric -- to be, in to-day's parlance, "his own person" and accountable as such. John 
Stuart Mill described it as "pursuing our own good in our own way". This, he believed, 
we should be free to do "so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or 
impede their efforts to obtain it".  
He added: 
Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily or mental and 
spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems 
good to themselves than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest. 
Liberty in a free and democratic society does not require the state to approve the 
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personal decisions made by its citizens; it does, however, require the state to 
respect them.
 505
 
In the above passage, adopted by Wilson J., Mills relates liberty to issues of body, 
psychology and spirituality, and argues that the state should be reticent to interfere with 
decisions falling within these domains.   
Moon highlights how inevitably some views in a democratic system will prevail over 
others, thereby restricting the liberty interests of some to the benefit of others. He suggests that 
“it cannot be enough that the conscientious (or religious) objector is committed to views or 
values that are inconsistent with state policy.” Moon suggests that freedom of conscience should 
be reserved for a certain class of conscientious beliefs that “stand outside ordinary political 
debate” or “that are at odds with the most basic moral or factual assumptions of the general 
community.” 506 The protection of claimants who are at odds with assumptions of the general 
community would assist claimants such as Ms. Finley, who, in R v Finley,
507
 objected to 
completing the long census form on the basis of the role played by Lockheed Martin in the 
Census and that company’s activities in relation to armaments.508 Ms. Finley did not claim that 
the forced government activity violated her freedom of conscience, although she might have 
benefited from such a claim. In the end, she was granted an absolute discharge, suggesting that 
even though she did not lead a successful defence, her conduct was not worthy of even nominal 
punishment.  
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However, limiting freedom of conscience to these particular classes might provide 
otherwise valid claims from succeeding. One might imagine working for a publicly funded 
transportation company before the abolition of slavery in the United States and objecting on the 
basis of conscience to transporting slaves to plantations. A contemporary example would be the 
recent proceedings initiated by the Christian Medical and Dental Society of Canada to have a 
policy overturned that would require them to partake in abortion or assisted suicide.
509
 Without 
weighing in on whether their claim should succeed, I would suggest that these types of claims 
would at least engage freedom of conscience. That doctors subjectively believe that they are 
participating in unethically ending of life, whether on account of religious or non-religious 
beliefs, arguably violates and more certainly relates to doctors’ freedom of conscience. Whether 
the balancing of rights and interest in the section 1 analysis should favour doctors in this case is 
quite another question.   
In any event, Moon holds that deeply held beliefs should not just be “fundamental to the 
individual but that they are part of a distinctive worldview,
510
 and this more generalized 
formulation would cover both Ms. Finley and the doctors not wishing to participate in activities 
that they perceive as unethical, subject of course to section 1.  
Protecting the pursuit of truth and human flourishing 
Haigh and Bowal also provide some insight into factors used to determine freedom of 
conscience claims. They suggest that freedom of conscience claims should (i) have some 
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connection to morality, and (ii) that the strongest claims evince some form of compulsion.”511 
However, as the authors discuss, determining morality may be problematic because any given 
action can be undertaken for moral or immoral reasons:
512
 Haigh and Bowal identify one of the 
challenges of adopting Wilson J.’s position in Mortgentaler, discussed above, which subtly 
equates liberty to morality is that morality can be difficult to identify:  
For example: washing hands before eating or prayer, for some religious adherents, is a 
matter of morality because it stems from a command from God. On the other hand, one 
can easily imagine decisions to terminate a pregnancy not based on morality--because 
having a child would, for example "cramp my single lifestyle," or would add to the "four 
children I already have and I don't need any more." A person's right to choose can all too 
easily become any decision made [conscientiously]; thus, the right to choose may not 
relate to morality, nor does the significance or insignificance of an act necessarily point 
us toward its morality.
513
 
The above passage highlights the subjectivity of morality, which might be addressed by 
restricting freedom of conscience claims to those that can relate to Charter values in a manner 
similar to arise the third stage of the freedom of expression analysis analysed above. Freedom of 
conscience would not protect every act that a citizen feels is a conscience-based decision. The 
claimant would need to articulate how the impugned activity relates not only to morality, but also 
to the pursuit of truth, participation in the community, or individual self-fulfillment and human 
flourishing. Charter values were also held in R v Oakes
514
 to include: 
[T]he inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to social justice and equality, 
accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and 
faith in social and political institutions which enhance the participation of individuals and 
groups in society.
515
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Unlike Mr. Hughes’ claim, Moon suggests that many attempts to claim rights under s. 2(a) 
are simply challenging the legitimacy of paternalistic laws and state authority:  
The conscientious objection is based not on the value the objector attaches to the 
particular practice but instead on the value of liberty and autonomy and the illegitimacy 
of state power. Such a claim may be too sweeping or too fundamental, for the court to 
contemplate under subsection 2(a).
516
 
The infringement of certain liberty interests can be justification when balanced against 
legitimate government interest. For example, in R v Locke,
517
 the Alberta Provincial Court found 
that legislation requiring wearing a seatbelt was justified on grounds of public safety. The Court 
found that the claimant’s opposition to the legislation was based on a different judgment on the 
safety of not wearing a seatbelt – not on a different value of safety.518  
This paper does not aim to weigh in on the issues presented in Mortgentaler or Locke, but 
suggests that these cases highlight the Court’s capacity to identify the purpose of a claim and 
determine whether it receive Charter protection. Smith J. suggests, “at the very least, the 
protection of s. 2(a) of the Charter, like s. 2(b) encompasses a range of activities that diminish, 
as they recede from a fundamental core, in constitutional value.
519
  In Locke, a differing value of 
a well-established safety concern such as wearing seat belts may be unlikely to fall within the 
scope of Charter values.  
In Hughes, there is also a legitimate government interest in safety, but that interest is not 
supported by empirical evidence. The liberty interests in Hughes, as Mr. Hughes acknowledges, 
relate to the right to grow one’s own food and is fundamentally aligned with the principles of 
food sovereignty. These are facets of Mr. Hughes’ conduct that the Court could consider in 
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determining whether the activity was undertaken in connection with a conscientious paradigm 
worthy of Charter protection.   
Protection of conscientious practices that resemble common religious practices 
Another argument advanced by Moon is that certain conscientious practices are sufficiently 
akin to religious practice and therefore must be worthy of protection as to avoid complete 
arbitrariness.
520
 Protection of non-religious practice may be limited to such practices that 
resemble religious practices in both content and structure.
521
 Professor and constitutional scholar 
Dwight Newman also suggests that freedom of conscience may have application to protect 
religious-like beliefs, and that this right could become increasingly important given that an 
“increasing number of Canadians call themselves ‘spiritual but not religious’.”522 Moon suggests 
that a conscientiously held belief may fall within the scope of s. 2(a) when it resembles a 
pragmatic religious belief/practice (a faith-based commitment) that is fundamental in 
significance, specific in content, peremptory in force and perceived by non-believers as 
inaccessible or unreasonable.
523
 
While there is limited case-law and academic commentary on the freedom of conscience
524
 
pursuant to s. 2(a), perhaps the only case in which a court has relied solely on conscience, 
Maurice v Canada,
525
 supports Moon’s conclusion that conscience protection might be related to 
protection of practices akin to religious ones. Jack Maurice, a federal inmate and former follower 
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of the Hare Krishna Faith, requested and was provided a vegetarian diet on religious grounds 
while he still belonged to the faith. After he renounced his faith, so too was his vegetarian diet 
denied to him.
 526
 In protest, Mr. Maurice refused to eat all of the food that was given to him 
because eating it was contrary to his conscience.
527
 He also appealed Corrections Canada’s 
refusal to provide him with a vegetarian diet on the basis that it violated his freedom of 
conscience.  
The court found that Corrections Canada’s decision to deny Mr. Maurice his vegetarian 
diet violated his freedom of conscience. The Court’s written decision did not significantly 
engage in a theoretical analysis of freedom of conscience. Rather, it applied what might be 
described as matter of fact or common sense reasoning, highlighting the arbitrariness that would 
arise if s. 2(a) only assisted Mr. Maurice’s vegetarianism while he belonged to a specific faith 
and not when he held a strong moral conviction. Moon notes that the practice protected in 
Maurice was specific, similar to a religious obligation, and that the practice is something that is 
ordinarily regarded as private. This may have helped the courts in accepting his claim. The state 
typically has no involvement in the dietary choices of individuals, but inherently does in this 
instance, and was exercising their involvement somewhat arbitrarily.
528
 
Based on the analysis in Maurice and freedom of religion precedent, Moon suggests that 
conscience claims that have no link to a cultural or religious group may be less likely to 
succeed.
529
 Newman also suggests that part of the protection of religious freedoms might stem 
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from their collective character.
530
 According to Newman, if the claim is based on equality 
concerns (i.e. “on preventing the marginalization of particular identity groups resulting from 
state interference with their practices”) in addition to liberty concerns (i.e. “reducing the 
situations in which an individual must choose between obeying the law or following her 
conscience”), then it would be more readily received by the courts.  
Another decision worth reviewing is that of Mornington (Township) v Kuepfer.
531
 In 
Kuepfer, Trachy J.P. of the Ontario Provincial Court applied Big M to the context of the two 
accuseds of Old Order Amish faith charged with “the offence of keeping a horse in a building 
(barn).”532 The alleged offence occurred on the properties of the defendants in a hamlet near 
Waterloo, Ontario.
533
  The Court accepted that it is against the practice and culture of Old Order 
Amish to drive cars, and accordingly, horseback and buggy is the primary mode of transportation 
for many Old Order Amish living in the area.
534
 According to one of the witnesses who was an 
Old Order Amish community member, anyone who broke this rule risked excommunication 
from the Old Order church.
535
  
The decision considered whether i) the bylaw was coercive to the lifestyles of the Old 
Order Amish, and, ii) whether the practice of keeping horses could be tolerated in light of the 
horses being kept in a hamlet.
536
 The courts found that they bylaws were indirectly coercive, 
notwithstanding that their primary purpose was to regulate health and safety in the context of 
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land use.
537
 In a manner consistent with Valverde’s works, the Court refused to disentangle the 
“use” of land and the people that live there: 
To use the words of the Crown, "In this country we cannot zone land based on people as 
opposed to use. Land is zoned on the basis of use and not people." I'm not so sure that 
position is correct. Land use practices are made by humans beings and are made with 
human beings in mind as well as land resources.
538
 
Accordingly, the case relates s. 2(a) issues to land-use and people, in a manner similar to 
that attempted by Mr. Hughes. For some, urban agriculture may be one of the few opportunities 
available to them to practice conscientious living in a Canadian cityscape, and therefore, it would 
be inappropriate to prioritize land use over the people who live there.  
Limits on conscience acts 
Like Newman, Moon suggests that freedom of conscience would need to have internal 
limits so as to assure its legitimacy against any reasonable state incursion.
539
 Some of these 
limitations might be adapted from other freedoms, such as freedom of expression’s preclusion of 
violence. For example, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Owens v Saskatchewan (Human 
Rights Commission)
540
 highlighted that religious speech and practice that harm others are not 
protected.
541
 It largely goes without saying the freedom of conscience would only protect non-
violent action, except in perhaps extreme circumstances.  
Other internal limitations articulated in Big M and Amselem concerning freedom of religion 
could be applied to freedom of conscience. For example, as with other fundamental freedoms, 
once freedom of religion is triggered, the claimant must then demonstrate the alleged 
                                                 
537
 Ibid at para 87.  
538
 Ibid at para 77.  
539
 Ibid at 422. 
540
 2006 SKCA 41, 267 DLR (4th) 733. 
541
 Ibid at para 61.  
 123 
infringement “interferes with his or her ability to act in accordance with his or her religious 
beliefs in a manner that is more than trivial or insubstantial.”542 In examining whether the 
interference is more than trivial or insubstantial, the Court provides that each case is to be 
examined in its own context. The contextual analysis considers the impacts of the claimants’ 
activity on the rights of others, and acknowledges that no rights are absolute.
543
 The 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal has held that in determining if a measure goes beyond trivial or 
insubstantial interference requires an “examination of the degree to which the freedom is 
burdened by the measure in question.”544 At this stage of the analysis, the question is not how 
significant the freedom is to the claimant, but rather how meaningfully the freedom can be 
exercised in light of the legislative measure being imposed.
545
  
From Big M, Dickson’s judgment incorporates some fundamental limits on section 2 that 
are comparable to nuisance law. The court noted the freedoms are “subject to such limitations as 
are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others”546 and that “such manifestations do not injure his or her neighbours or their 
parallel rights to hold and manifest beliefs and opinions of their own.”547 Similarly, in 2004, the 
Supreme Court of Canada Amselem
548
 held that “[t]he ultimate protection of any particular 
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Charter right must be measured in relation to other rights and with a view to the underlying 
context in which the apparent conflict arises.”549  
In Amselem, the court justified the applicant’s religious practice noting that it takes place 
only nine days of the year, can conform to safety bylaws, and that the intrusion must “conform as 
much as possible with general aesthetics of the property.”550 Similarly, in Kuepfer, the scope of 
the decision was restricted to the context of the particular hamlet and to the keeping of one horse 
in a sanitary manner and for the sole purpose of transportation.
551
 Resident testimony, as well as 
the prevalence of Old Order Amish in the area, demonstrated that the “injury” from horse 
manure was not overbearing on the local residents.
552
 The tolerance of horses appeared in part to 
be because of their transportation function.  The court noted that transportation is something 
otherwise available to the public at large, and that the bylaw indirectly restricts the transportation 
of the Amish.
553
 In the Court’s view, hamlets, as opposed cities or towns, “are designed as an 
asset to the rural countryside and to provide an alternative residential environment for the 
members of the rural community.”554  
In sum, the requirement of non-violence, the balancing of interests on a nuisance style of 
analysis, triviality, and the availability of other means of practicing the conscience act are all 
ways in which the courts could limit conscience claims.  
                                                 
549
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Developing a list of factors for freedom of conscience 
In summary of the preceding sections that consider the test for freedom of religion, the test 
for freedom of expression, and the theoretical works of Moon and others, the potential success 
for a claim based on freedom of conscience may be greatest where: 
1. The contentious practice is subjectively compelled or ascribed by a deeply held moral 
belief or commitment.  
2. The contentious practice promotes the pursuit of truth, participation in the 
community, or individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing. 
3. The claimant sincerely holds this moral belief or commitment.  
4. The legislation in question interferes with the claimant’s ability to act in accordance 
with his or her moral belief or commitment in a manner that is more than trivial or 
insubstantial; and,  
5. The practice does not materially interfere with the safety, health and welfare of 
others.  
The first three factors are used to characterize the right and the claimant’s relationship to 
the moral position or belief in question. The fourth factor establishes a state impediment to 
practicing the morally compelled belief.  The fifth factor is used to balance the claimant’s rights 
against others and society’s at large. These factors are provided only as a starting point in what 
would need to be a much more focused and theorized discussion of freedom of conscience than 
what is available here.  
Finally, and as a more general proposition of law, claims to freedom of conscience would 
be more likely to succeed where the law being challenged is prohibitive in nature. When an 
activity that would otherwise be protected by a fundamental freedom is prohibited by a 
government decision or legislative action, it is less likely that prohibition will be justified under 
the minimal impairment stage of the section 1 analysis, unless a full prohibition is required to 
achieve the government’s objective.   
The factors outlined above are applied to the case of R v Hughes in the following section 
with a view of inviting the Court to undertake a more rigorous analysis of freedom of conscience 
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claims. Given that factor 5 above was largely addressed in Chapter 4, issues of nuisance and the 
balancing of rights are not addressed in this Chapter.   
5.4 Application of Freedom of Conscience Test to Hughes 
Skene J’s analysis focused primarily on whether the bylaw had coercive impact and more 
than trivial or insubstantial impact on Mr. Hughes’ desire to grow chickens, which would 
correspond to the fourth factor listed above. Having found that the bylaw did not impede his 
desire to raise urban hens and produce eggs from those hens on his residential property, Skene J. 
concluded that the RPO Bylaw was not coercive and did not impair Mr. Hughes’ rights. There 
was little analysis in Hughes that would relate to factors 1-3 above. As discussed in the 
paragraphs that follow, this section argues that the Court’s analysis did not address Hughes’ 
interest, which was focused on producers’ rights and sovereignty. Further, the Court arguably 
applied a freedom of belief test to Mr. Hughes’ freedom of conscience interest.   
Factors 1-3: Characterization of the Right the Moral Belief or Practice at Issue 
Skene J. summarized Hughes’ claim that the RPO Bylaw violates his freedom of 
conscience by not allowing him to “ raise urban hens and produce eggs from those hens on his 
residential property.”555 Hughes claimed that he believed the practice of keeping hens was best 
for him and his family, and that it related to his sustainability related activism.
556
 He further 
stated that the bylaw was “cruel and unusual” as it denied him the right to eat the food that he 
wants to consume – the right to decide what he gets to put into his body.557 He also cited his 
concern of “caged, factory farming practises” as being inconsistent with his “deep respect for 
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life”.558  Referring back to chapter 2, Hughes’ view is consistent with the definition of food 
sovereignty, an ecological and sustainable food system focused on the rights of those who 
produce, distribute and consume food.
 559
  
Hughes is not only growing food; Hughes is challenging the norm of urban land-use by 
demonstrating an alternative way of relating to urban spaces. While not articulated in the 
freedom of conscience part of Hughes’ claim, Mr. Hughes was keeping chickens to demonstrate 
discontent with the state of affairs pertaining to the environment and the global food system. He 
is not challenging the right to grow chickens just anywhere; he has specified his urban backyard 
as ground zero for Canada’s trial on the right to food. Accordingly, he is challenging how land is 
used in urban areas in relation to his environmental goals described above. In a setting preserved 
for material accumulation and consumption (the opposite of sustainability), as well as for 
aesthetic uniformity and predictability (the opposite of a hen-house), Hughes conscience compels 
him to use this environment for sustainable food growing practices, marred by life and nature. It 
is likely that his conscience compelled him to express this discontent in the way that he did; not 
only did he educate others, he challenged the bylaw so that others would have an opportunity to 
engage in the provisioning of urban protein legally.  
Hughes’ claim, especially as a self-represented litigant, appears to reasonably fall within 
the gambit of factors 1-3 above, which consider whether the practice is i) compelled or ascribed 
by a deeply held moral belief or commitment; ii) promotes the pursuit of truth, participation in 
the community, or individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing, and iii) that the claimant is 
sincere.  
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Mr. Hughes describes a deep commitment to controlling what he consumes. For a 
conscientious being such as Mr. Hughes, it is hard to see how food consumption could be 
anything but deeply personal. Hughes takes his claim a step further, connecting his practice to 
broader environmental principles of sustainability, animal rights, and respect for life, and would 
therefore satisfy the second commitment. Satisfying the second step was discussed in relation to 
the freedom of expression test in Section 5.2. The latter, respect for life, clearly makes his claim 
analogous to a religious claim. In the same vein, given that most environmental claims relate to 
respect for life, it might be loosely acknowledged that environmental claims have at least some 
semblance to religious ones. Finally, in relation to the third factor, there is nothing to indicate 
that Mr. Hughes is insincere in holding his personal convictions.  
Factor 4: Subjectively Held Coercive Burden and Trivial or Insubstantial Impact 
Skene J. held that the purpose of the RPO Bylaw was the “prevention or control of 
potential residential nuisance sources, safety and liveability issues.”560 The effect of the bylaw 
was found to be that Mr. Hughes could not grow chickens for consumption, and that he would 
have to purchase eggs from the store or a farmer.
561
 Skene J. held that the bylaw did not create a 
coercive burden on his conscience that would not be trivial or insubstantial.
562
  
For the most part, Skene J. provides a rather progressive and defensible review of law 
relating to freedom of conscience. However, Skene J.’s decision appears to turn on a dissenting 
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opinion from the Manitoba Court of Appeal, which I would argue is inconsistent with the rest of 
his analysis for reducing conscience to thought.  
Skene J. cites Wilson J.’s minority decision in Morgentaler563 for the proposition that 
““conscience” and “religion” should not be treated as tautologous if capable of independent, 
although related, meaning” and cites a lower court case which suggests that “claimant to show 
that his or her conscientiously-held moral view might reasonably be threatened by the legislation 
in question, and that the coercive burden on his or her conscience would not be trivial or 
insubstantial.”
564
 
Skene J. referred to the Manitoba Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Mackay v Manitoba,565 a 
decision that engages the complex issue of the morality of taxation, and more specifically, the 
expenditure of money to aid political candidates based on the shares of votes they receive. He 
cites the majority‘s reasoning: 
The Constitution does not guarantee that the state will not act inimically to a citizen’s 
standards of proper conduct; it merely guarantees that a citizen will not be required to do, 
or refrain from doing, something contrary to those standards … The support given by the 
government to political causes hostile to the general, or a minority, viewpoint cannot 
induce in anyone a pang on conscience for the moral quality of their own conduct or lack 
of it.
566
 [emphasis added] 
This passage does not necessarily conflict with the factors set out above.  
Interestingly Skene J. goes on to cite and apply the dissenting opinion of the same decision, 
Mackay v Manitoba,
567
 and it is at this juncture that I would depart from Skene J.’s analysis:  
The legislative program of a government does not constitute an interference with one’s 
freedom of conscience, nor one’s freedom of thought, belief or opinion. Whatever the 
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legislative direction of our parliamentarians or legislators, a citizen is free to think and 
believe and give expression to contrary ideas. His freedoms are not compromised. He is 
free to work towards different objectives, and the election of persons who will better 
reflect his views in the next election. . . .
568
 
While most government programs will not constitute an interference with one’s 
fundamental freedoms, to state that a claimant’s remedy is to vote flies in the face of the Charter. 
It must be recalled that the purpose of the Charter is in many respects to limit government 
action. Accordingly, to rely on this passage sets a dangerous precedent, or more likely, a 
reviewable error in law. Further, it could be argued the dissenting judge equated freedom of 
conscience to freedom of belief.  
In any event, Skene J. appears to hold that Hughes was not required to agree with the 
legislation, and therefore it was not coercive. Skene J. found that Hughes was not compelled to 
agree with the appropriateness of s. 27 of the RPO Bylaw: “Hughes has honestly held views, 
opinions and thoughts respecting what he believes are his rights as a citizen to raise urban hens, 
but that does not equate to an interference with his freedom of conscience.”569  The above is 
inclusive of Skene J’s analysis. Skene J.’s analysis rightly considers whether Hughes’ was 
coerced by s. 27 of the RPO Bylaw. However, the judgment is silent as to whether the Bylaw 
violates Hughes guarantee to freedom of conscience and religion by having him ‘refrain’ from 
conduct that Hughes’ alleges is central to his freedom of conscience.  
Reading between the lines, Skene J.’s selection of case law and brevity of analysis may 
have been undertaken with a view of avoiding some of the messy and challenging unanswered 
questions pertaining to the meaning of “conscience” in the context of s. 2(a)’s “freedom of 
conscience”. As noted in some of the more recent and comprehensive treatises on Constitutional 
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law in Canada, there is very little appellate level case law to draw guidance from on the meaning 
and scope of “conscience”.  
One of the challenges of Mr. Hughes’ claim would be to establish that his practice is 
premised on a deeply held belief and therefore worthy of protection. While his commitment to 
the environment and social justice would be undeniable, it would likely be argued for proponents 
of the RPO Bylaw that its burden on Hughes’ commitments is trivial and insubstantial. 
Proponents might argue that there are numerous ways of promoting environmental and social 
objectives, not all of which require that Mr. Hughes’ break the law. While true, the nature in 
which individuals can attempt to address a systems-level issue – such as the food system – 
typically requires them to undertake small and sometimes even tokenistic measures of change 
that if, and only if, they are adopted by larger groups can there be measurable impact. 
Accordingly, when considering whether Hughes’ practice is trivial or insubstantial, the Court 
should give some consideration to the potential cumulative effect of the claimant’s activity being 
adopted by others.  
The RPO Bylaw necessarily narrows the scope of what Mr. Hughes can eat, and thereby 
coerces him to purchase from alternative sources or to move outside of the city. It is likely that 
the RPO Bylaw is coercive because it reduces his choice of what he eats. The net impact is that 
Mr. Hughes has to purchase animal protein from a larger and more distant farming operation. 
One might argue that Mr. Hughes could achieve most of his environmental goals by purchasing 
eggs from a local conscientious farmer. However, whether that operation is industrial or large 
scale organic, it is not his own chickens from his own backyard. While it is possible that the 
practices of some of the local farmers are consistent with the demands of Hughes’ conscience, 
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such compromise only captures part of Mr. Hughes’ interests of changing how we relate to urban 
environments.  
As mentioned above, Mr. Hughes is demonstrating a suitable and safe use of urban space 
that works towards an environmental goal. While some would suggest that he could raise them 
outside the city, it should be kept in mind that in Amselem the Court did not require the claimants 
to relocate in order to set up their succah simply because doing so would be an alternative 
suitable to the condominium corporation. That Hughes could satisfy his conscience in food 
production somewhere else is largely irrelevant to his claim. His claim advocates for a new 
approach to land use that recognizes his environmental and social beliefs – his conscience. 
Accordingly, Hughes’ practice could likely be defended on either an objective or subjective basis 
on the fourth factor.  
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CHAPTER 6 -  CONCLUSION 
 
This work has focused on three ways of advancing the freedom to farm in an urban 
environment.  
First, under the application of municipal law, freedom to farm in an urban environment is 
advanced by establishing a basis for alleging arbitrary and moral reasoning. In the case of hen-
keeping, the gap between the perceived risk of harm from urban agricultural activities and the 
empirical evidence of harm caused by urban agriculture assists in making this claim.  
In Saskatoon, challenging urban agricultural laws requires a challenge to urban norms. 
Looking at the history of North American cities’ bylaws, including Saskatoon’s, the inclusion or 
exclusion of animals correlates with the concentration of agricultural industries and the 
industrialization of agriculture. As discussed in relation to the works of Valverde, the ideology of 
uniformity in urban environments is deeply rooted in our culture and municipal decision-making 
processes, such as those promoting the use of urban spaces for sustainable purposes. These 
ideologies can be challenged through litigation as was demonstrated in Bell v Toronto (City), and 
to some extent, in R v Hughes. The common theme in these cases is that the interests of food 
growing should take precedent over the desire for uniformity in urban environments, especially 
when food growing does not pose any significant risks in relation to others’ health, safety and 
nuisance interests.  
Second, the inherently expressive nature of personal property use, in conjunction with the 
progressive goals and policies of food sovereignty, support a challenge of urban agricultural 
restrictions on the basis that they violate the guarantee to freedom of expression under the 
Charter. A prohibition on keeping urban hens, an activity that would largely go unnoticed, 
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parallels interests that have already been protected in other cases involving counter-advertising 
on private property where signs are prohibited, and the keeping of a naturalized garden. 
Finally, this work investigates the potential to further freedom of conscience in the context 
of food production in an urban environment. Agriculture impacts significantly on our local and 
global environmental, social and economic systems. In order to succeed on a claim related to 
freedom of conscience related to urban agriculture, the claimant may be tasked by the Court with 
developing a framework for establishing a freedom of conscience argument. Mr. Hughes’ 
presents as an ideal candidate for advancing the freedom of conscience claim because of his 
articulated conscientiously based reasoning for challenging the bylaw and his personal record of 
following his conscience. Mr. Hughes’ subjective reasoning for deregulating urban chickens 
parallels a viewpoint premised on the objectives of food sovereignty. Accordingly, a win for Mr. 
Hughes or a similarly placed future litigant would entrench the subjective belief of food 
sovereignty as a framework that advances Charter values in Canadian case law.  
From a social perspective, food sovereignty recognizes the importance of food rights and 
the rights of producers to participate in the development of food policy. At a local level, food 
sovereignty aims to protect producers from the overbearing governments and corporations who 
often hold a disproportionate amount of power in decision making. This generalized viewpoint is 
applicable to the context of Saskatoon where the prohibition on an otherwise legal food growing 
activity is upheld with little regard to the interests of those who aim to benefit from deregulation.  
Further, the need to re-think how land is used in urban environments is highlighted by the 
urgency to address climate change issues and other social and environmental facets of the global 
food system. To push small animals out of the city is disproportionate to the largely unnoticed 
negative impacts that hen keeping would cause. Agriculture and its distribution form the fabric 
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of the greatest environmental and social issues of our time, and therefore some of the greatest 
ethical and moral questions.  
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